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D I G G I N G D E E P E R I N TO , A N D T H I N K I N G
B E T T E R A B O U T, T H E I N T E R P L AY
O F FA M I L I E S A N D C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E
Douglas A. Berman*

The book Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family
Ties1 is a must-read for anyone interested in family law and American
criminal justice doctrines. The book is an extraordinary contribution not
only because it effectively documents the signiﬁcant interaction between
family status and formal criminal law, but also because it critically assesses
the history of and justiﬁcations for family status criminal law doctrines. I
consider profoundly important the book’s descriptive account of “how
family members and their interests intersect with . . . the American criminal justice system” (xii), but I ﬁnd the authors’ description of this intersection disappointingly shallow. More signiﬁcantly, I am troubled by what
seem to be key normative assumptions and arguments the authors make
in Privilege or Punish.
I . A N I M P O R TA N T ( B U T S H A L LOW ) S P OT L I G H T
O N FA M I L I E S A N D C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E

As rightly noted by the authors of Privilege or Punish, the family issues they
examine have yet to be thoroughly analyzed and critically assessed in the
modern criminal law literature. The authors are to be complimented for spotlighting the “panoply of laws expressly drawn to privilege or disadvantage

*William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law.
1. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, & Ethan J. Leib, Privilege or Punish: Criminal
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties (2009).
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 13, Number 1, pps 119–126. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-4206. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content
through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.
ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2010.13.1.119.
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persons based on family status alone” (xv). But, given that the authors repeatedly return to the claim that “primary criminal justice values” are
“prosecuting the guilty fairly and protecting the innocent from crime and
prosecution” (151), I was disappointed by the lack of engagement with some
basic realities concerning the interplay of families ties, gender dynamics,
and crime and justice.
Privilege or Punish is ﬂush with speculations about how criminal law doctrines that beneﬁt or burden family ties might possibly affect criminal justice
accuracy and crime control. But the book fails to discuss or even mention fundamental crime data and research concerning how family ties are known to affect criminal offending or prosecution. In my view, the authors’ failure to
acknowledge and assess what is already known about the relationship of family status, gender dynamics, and crime is a problematic omission: unless and
until we have a deep understanding and full appreciation of the interplay of
family connections and crime, accounts and assessments of family-affected
criminal laws will be incomplete and potentially distorting.
My concerns are driven by extant data and research concerning the
dynamic and consequential relationship between families and criminal
offending, especially as these issues intersect with gendered realities. For example, despite roughly equal representation in the general population, the
vast majority of violent offenders are men (perhaps nearly 90 percent), but
a high percentage of “female violent offenders had a prior relationship with
the victim as an intimate, relative, or acquaintance.”2 These gender differences are especially stark in the context of murder: men are ten times more
likely to commit murder than women, but those relatively few women who
do commit murder are three times more likely than men to kill a family
member or intimate.3 Such gender differences also affect the relationship between families and criminal victimization: women are more than ﬁve times
more likely than men to be violently victimized by an intimate partner,4 and
nearly two thirds of female homicide victims “were killed by a family member or an intimate partner.”5

2. Lawrence A. Greenfeld & Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Women Offenders
3 (1999) [hereinafter Women Offenders].
3. Id. at 4.
4. See Shannan Catallano et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female Victims of Violence
1 (2009).
5. Id. at 3.
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In addition, at least for women, there seems to be a statistically significant relationship between family history and serious criminal activity:
women subject to criminal justice control “are substantially more likely
than the equivalent general population to have never been married,”6 and
“over a third of imprisoned women had been abused by an intimate in the
past; and just under a quarter reported prior abuse by a family member.”7
And, critically, recent criminology research suggests that a sizeable and disproportionate amount of criminal offending by women can be traced back
to intimate relationships with men. For example, one recent article concludes, based on interviews with female offenders, that there is “widespread
use of devices by males ranging from various forms of manipulation to direct physical coercion in order to ensure female compliance with their
criminal activities.”8
More fundamentally, there is an extraordinary amount of sophisticated
sociological and criminology research examining the relationship between
family ties and criminal offending. One recent article has summarized this
research and modern ﬁndings in this way:
In criminologists’ search for the causes of crime, perhaps no social institution
has received more attention than the family. . . . A large body of research in
this area reveals many family variables signiﬁcantly related to crime. Most notably, juveniles commit fewer criminal acts when they are emotionally attached
to parents, exposed to consistent parental supervision, reinforced when they
engage in prosocial behavior, and exposed to consistent, fair, and nonphysical
parental discipline.9

Of course, all these data and related research studies provide only a partial snapshot of the complex and dynamic relationships among crime, gender, and family status. But they spotlight why family status implicates
6. Women Offenders, supra note 2, at 7.
7. Id. at 1.
8. Stephen Jones, Partners in Crime: A Study of the Relationship Between Female
Offenders and Their Co-defendants, 8 Criminology & Crim. Just. 147, 147 (2008); see also
Christopher Mullins & Richard Wright, Gender, Social Networks, and Residential
Burglary, 41 Criminology 813 (2003); Dorinda Welle & Greg Falkin, The Everyday Policing
of Women with Romantic Codefendants: An Ethnographic Perspective, 11 Women & Crim.
Just. 45 (2000).
9. Carter Hay et al., The Impact of Community Disadvantage on the Relationship
Between the Family and Juvenile Crime, 43 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 236, 327–29 (2006).
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fundamental sociological and criminogenic realities that must be explored
to gain a deep and true understanding of, in the words of the book’s subtitle, “Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties.” Unfortunately,
Privilege or Punish not only fails to engage these key sociological and
criminogenic realities, but largely fails even to acknowledge the profound interactions of families ties, gender dynamics, and criminal offending that operate beneath the formal criminal law doctrines being
discussed and assailed.
Put simply (and to risk seeming to quibble over semantics), the subtitle of Privilege or Punish is problematic and misleading because the authors in fact only examine formal criminal law doctrines. The book fails to
acknowledge, let alone describe and critically engage, real-world criminal
justice outcomes. The authors might respond that their goal was only to discuss and assess formal doctrines and not real-world outcomes. If so, they
at least should have made this important point clearer in both the title and
text. But, more problematically, the authors’ argument against family ties
beneﬁts is premised on asserted concerns about “accurate and just imposition of punishment” (27–29), about whether criminal justice systems
“treat citizens’ interest with equal concern” (29–31), and about “incentivizing more criminal activity and more successful criminal activity” (32).
In other words, throughout Privilege or Punish, the authors make a series
of normative judgments about formal family ties doctrines based on suppositions about possible real-world criminal justice outcomes—suppositions that, in my view, are often questionable. It is problematic for much
of the authors’ normative framework and analysis to be premised upon
suppositions about real-world criminal justice outcomes when the text
never explores the real-world interplay of family ties, gender dynamics,
and criminal offending.
Reﬂecting on the basic data and research discussed above concerning
relationships between families and criminal offending suggests a much different normative story than told by the authors of Privilege or Punish. As
a matter of real-world criminal justice outcomes, it would seem that for all
persons—and perhaps especially for women—healthy, wholesome, and
happy family ties are likely to advance the authors’ asserted normative
commitments, while unhealthy, unwholesome, and unhappy family ties are
likely to undermine these normative commitments. If this is true, then
it is misguided for the authors to call for a general presumption against
both family status beneﬁts and burdens in the criminal justice system.
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Preferable would be a general presumption in favor of beneﬁts for healthy,
wholesome, and happy family ties and a general presumption in favor of
burdens for unhealthy, unwholesome, and unhappy family ties.
In this space, I cannot and will not try to develop in detail the basis for my
own belief that governments ought to have lots of laws—not only criminal
justice laws, but also lots of other types of law—that endeavor to support
and sustain healthy, wholesome, and happy family ties. But I will assert
that most people involved in the day-to-day operation of criminal justice
systems realize that “good” family connections and commitments often
help prevent crime and associated social ills, whereas “bad” family connections and commitments often help produce crime and associated social ills.
Consequently, I ﬁnd it especially troublesome that the authors of Privilege
or Punish often make blanket claims about families and criminal justice
without any effort to distinguish between “good” and “bad” families. This
is why I fear that, because of the absence of a serious engagement with the
dynamic interplay of family connections and crime, the account and assessment of family-affected criminal laws in Privilege or Punish is problematically shallow and potentially distorting.

I I . A R E T H E AU T H O R S R E A L LY I N T E R E S T E D
I N “ P R I M A RY C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E VA L U E S ” ?

I had a nagging feeling while reading Privilege or Punish that the authors
are not nearly as concerned about criminal justice systems as they are
about the construction and norms of family status in modern society. I
suspect that the authors’ failure to engage real-world criminal justice outcomes may be because their true project and motivation is to criticize family
laws and norms that can result in inequality, gender bias, heteronormitivity,
and repronormativity. Put more provocatively, I believe that the authors are
not really interested in the “primary criminal justice values” of “prosecuting the guilty fairly and protecting the innocent from crime and prosecution” (151), but rather are fundamentally dedicated to assailing a “traditional
conception of the family” in favor promoting “voluntary relationships of
care” (xx).
The authors’ true goals and commitments in Privilege or Punish are indirectly revealed in Part II of the book, which focuses on family ties burdens. In this part, the authors make the surprising—and, in my view,
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unsupportable—assertion that considerations of “crime creation and inaccuracy” are “mostly inapplicable in the context of family ties burdens”
(82). But, in a notable footnote, the authors concede that certain family
ties burdens “are creating a new class of criminals” and may “increase systemic inaccuracy in the criminal justice system” (199–200 n.9). The authors’
eagerness in Part II to discount swiftly considerations of crime control and
criminal justice accuracy is startling and telling: in Part I, the authors were
eager to make (questionable) suppositions about possible real-world criminal justice outcomes in order to attack family ties beneﬁts; in Part II, they
curiously conclude that these considerations are now “mostly inapplicable”
when it comes to family ties burdens.
The authors’ disinterest in real-world criminal justice matters is further
revealed by their notable decisions (1) to leave the pervasive problem of domestic violence to a very brief coda, and (2) to avoid discussion of the rates
and nature of intrafamily homicides, sexual violence, and other serious
crimes. Much of the modern evolution of certain criminal law doctrines
and practices—ranging from the elimination of marital rape exceptions, to
the invocation of uniquely severe sentences when parents rape or kill their
children, to the creation of mandatory prosecution programs for domestic
violence and mandatory reporting requirements for child abuse—reﬂect
the efforts and desires of policymakers and criminal justice administrators
to respond better to the unique and uniquely important challenges presented by domestic violence and other intrafamily crimes. Privilege or
Punish barely mentions these still evolving criminal justice stories—except
perhaps when they serve the authors’ goal of arguing that those criminal
law doctrines that respect or reﬂect “traditional ideals of the family . . . [are]
plainly and perniciously discriminatory” (154).
Critically, because my specialty is criminal justice and not family law, I
am disinclined to question the authors’ interest in assailing a “traditional
conception of the family.” Moreover, I instinctually share the authors’ basic concern that the construction and norms of family status in modern society may harmfully advance inequality, gender bias, heteronormitivity, and
repronormativity. Nevertheless, many normative assertions in Privilege or
Punish about family status still struck me as peculiar and off-putting. For
example, the authors suggest that family status is a “morally arbitrary”
characteristic (29). But I have a very hard time thinking anyone—including the authors themselves—genuinely believe or would persistently
assert that an individual’s decision to get married (or divorced) or to have
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a child (or to disown a child) is a “morally arbitrary” or ethically inconsequential act.
The authors might respond that their claim of moral arbitrariness is
meant to be more limited and only reﬂects their notion, explained in a footnote, that having a family “is often morally irrelevant from the standpoint
of determining criminal liability” (180 n.62). But even stated in this more
limited way, the authors’ apparent moral compass seems questionable. Are
the authors of Privilege or Punish really claiming, for example, that there
is no relevant moral difference between a father’s raping his own daughter
and raping someone else’s child; that there is no relevant moral difference
between a mother’s decision to “kidnap” her own son from an abusive exhusband and kidnapping someone else’s child; that there is no relevant
moral difference between a modern-day Jean Valjean stealing bread to feed
his own family and stealing bread to give to a soup kitchen?
The authors may have sophisticated responses to my normative inquiries, but much more needs to be said in this regard to support their arguments for a general presumption against both family ties beneﬁts and
family ties burdens. I fear that the authors too readily assume that readers
will share their apparent instinct that “having a family” is morally comparable to “being of a certain race or religion” (180 n.62), at least for purposes of the criminal justice system. The normative claims in Privilege or
Punish are understandable—though still surely contestable—if one agrees
that “having a family” is the moral equivalent of “being of a certain race
or religion.” But this claim of moral equivalency is hard for me to embrace
without more explanation—not only because there are so many different
dimensions to “having a family” (many of which can be freely chosen and
easily altered), but also because nearly all people have at least some family
connections through which they have made some kind of felt moral commitment or, at the very least, some kind of personal emotional investment.
At this point, I will summarize by stressing again that I wish the book
had engaged with what is already known about the dynamic and consequential real-world relationship between families and criminal offending. I
return to this point because I fear that the day-to-day realities of modern
crime and punishment have a much more profound impact on inequality,
gender bias, heteronormitivity, and repronormativity than any formal
criminal law doctrines. As detailed before, basic crime statistics reveal that
men are disproportionately the perpetrators of serious crime and that
women are disproportionately their victims, and considerable sociological
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and criminology research suggests that supporting healthy, wholesome,
and happy family ties may be the best way to reduce serious criminal offending by men directed toward women. Given their normative commitments, the authors of Privilege or Punish perhaps ought to be worrying a
whole lot less about changing formal criminal law doctrines, and a whole
lot more about changing real-world criminal justice outcomes that intersect
with family matters. Indeed, basic crime data and related research suggest
that we might best serve not only “primary criminal justice values,” but
also the other goals of the authors of Privilege or Punish by ensuring that
as many people as possible—and especially crime-prone males without
stable social structures—are situated deeply and meaningfully within
healthy, wholesome, and happy families.

CONCLUS ION

As noted at the outset, Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the
Challenge of Family Ties makes a signiﬁcant and important contribution to
modern criminal law literature by effectively documenting the array of formal criminal law doctrines that expressly privilege or disadvantage people
based on family status. But because the authors’ real normative concerns
seem to be about the construction and norms of family status in modern
society, anyone deeply interested in the challenges of family ties for realworld crime and justice may come away from the book more puzzled than
satisﬁed.
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P R OT E CT A N D P R E S E R V E ?
Naomi Cahn*

Families nurture, sustain, protect, and shelter all of us, for better or for worse,
for good behavior and for bad behavior. And, as Professors Dan Markel,
Jennifer Collins, and Ethan Leib remind us, families provide a legally sanctioned structure for imposing both beneﬁts and burdens on allegedly criminal
actors.1 The publication of their book Privilege or Punish provides a constructive opportunity to examine critically the role of family status, family life, and
familial responsibilities in the administration of criminal justice.
Criminal justice has historically been concerned with crimes between
strangers; indeed, the very development of family ties beneﬁts2 such as marital privilege shows the privacy that has guarded the sanctity of the traditional
family and that has protected crimes occurring within it. In protecting the
private sphere of the family and promoting harmony within the family, the
law has created a set of familial credits and debits that are not only arbitrary
but also potentially dangerous. The beneﬁts may encourage, rather than deter, criminal behavior, and the burdens may unjustly penalize otherwise noncriminal actions.
The jurisprudential respect for family along with the traditional deference to internal family matters3 contribute to the significance of this

*Naomi Cahn is the John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law at George
Washington University Law School. ncahn@law.gwu.edu. Thanks to Dan Markel, Jennifer
Collins, Ethan Leib, and June Carbone.
1. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, & Ethan J. Leib, Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice
and the Challenge of Family Ties (2009).
2. E.g., id. at xii.
3. On family privacy, see, e.g, Ariela Dubler, Sexing Skinner (forthcoming 2010); Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Conﬁdentiality,
96 Geo. L.J. 123, 128 (2007).
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 13, Number 1, pps 127–141. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-4206. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content
through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.
ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2010.13.1.127.
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reexamination of the relationship between family status and criminal law.
The authors’ analysis provides a systemic, and systematic, review of the
impact of the defendant’s familial responsibilities and ties on the criminal
justice system. And their suggestions for how criminal law should—and
should not—account for family status provide thought-provoking policy
recommendations; regardless of how you have thought about these issues
before reading the book, the authors challenge you to rethink the various
ways that criminal law does, and should, consider familial status. Different
aspects of this project involve challenges to the deﬁnition of the type of
“family” status that subjects an individual to specialized treatment, potential redeﬁnitions and eliminations of various classes of crimes, and—my
project here—an examination of the thickness of relationships created by
feelings of family connection, and how the law should respond to the
emotional and psychological complexities of intrafamilial bonds.4
This essay interrogates the standards through which we can justify the
differential treatment of family members within the criminal justice system by looking at the creation, nature, and nurture of intrafamilial relationships. First, it critically examines the basis of the liberal minimalist
approach that Professors Markel, Collins, and Leib employ. Second, it
suggests that any coherent and cohesive standard must provide a more
complex understanding of how families actually operate, of the vulnerability and trust created through, and throughout, the family. Finally, it
applies this new understanding to domestic violence.
I . T H E BA S E : VO L U N T E E R I N G TO B E FA M I LY

As an initial matter, I want to explore the justiﬁcations for different rules
based on family status: we might believe, as do Professors Markel, Collins,
and Leib, that a “liberal minimalist” approach to the use of criminal law

4. On emotion in the law, see, e.g., Dan Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal
Law, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1621, 1656 (1999); Clare Huntington, Family Law’s Textures, Emory
L.J. (forthcoming 2010); Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 Duke L.J. 1245,
1274–93 (2008) (examining the relationship between family law and the “law and emotion” perspective); Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and
Conﬂict After Divorce, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441, 482–94 (2008) (same); Reva Siegel,
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions under Casey/Carhart, 117
Yale L.J. 1694, 1706–35 (2008).
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is appropriate. This approach implies stringent protections against the imposition of criminal sanctions, leading, in their view, to a general presumption against either family burdens or family beneﬁts (xix), although
they acknowledge that this presumption can be overcome.5 For family ties
burdens (the focus of this essay), overcoming the presumption involves
two elements: the familial relationship must be voluntary, and the government must have an “important or compelling objective” as its basis for
burdening an individual based on his or her familial relationships (95–96).
This state objective turns out quite frequently, according to the authors,
to be improving responsible behavior.6
Voluntariness and caregiving should, in fact, play important roles in establishing when family ties burdens provide a permissible basis for the imposition or enhancement of criminal penalties. As the authors point out,
spousehood and parenthood (from the parent’s perspective) are presumptively such relationships (90–91), in that family members have agreed, by
accepting speciﬁc roles, to serve as caretakers for one another. The critical
issue here, however, is whether the voluntary assumption of these roles
should be critical to drawing the line between when criminal law can take
family status into account and when it cannot. For the authors, it should
be. Five crimes—omissions liability, parental responsibility laws, bigamy,
adultery, and nonpayment of child support (85)—involve familial relationships based on voluntary caretaking, and so meet this ﬁrst element; by
contrast, incest, which has elements of both voluntariness and involuntariness, and ﬁlial responsibility laws may not satisfy this element.
I think the concept of voluntariness in both contexts, whether it be parent/child or spouse/spouse, is highly problematic and insufﬁciently thick.7
It is difﬁcult to assure voluntariness in conjunction with parenthood, at

5. Moreover, as Professors Alice Ristroph and Melissa Murray point out, the critical issue for Professors Markel, Collins, and Leib is a “statist” argument: “. . . whether or not
families serve the interests of the state. The relevant perspective is the perspective of the
state itself,” Disestablishing the Family, Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
6. The state might also seek to respect the intimacy and trust that typify intrafamilial
relationships by protecting the victim from ongoing breaches of trust. See infra (discussions of incest and domestic violence).
7. Markel, Collins, and Leib do recognize some of the issues involved in voluntariness
and the lack thereof, such as when men engage in sexual intercourse having taken precautions not to conceive a baby, where there has been rape, or where pregnancy has been
achieved through gamete provision (100–02).
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least when it comes to poor people who become parents: their contraceptive use is circumscribed by a ﬁnancial inability to access birth control.
Similarly, it is difﬁcult to assume voluntariness of spousehood in the context of domestic violence. This section explores the concept of voluntariness as a necessary predicate, focusing on one of the most problematic
aspects of voluntariness with respect to reproductive choices: socioeconomic class.
In explaining why voluntariness counts, the authors explain, “A
mother who does not wish to parent is legally free to use very reliable
birth control methods—and she may terminate her pregnancy or place a
child up for adoption” (88). Well, not really. Poor women are least likely
to use birth control and most likely to experience unplanned pregnancies.
To call their parenthood “voluntary” distorts the concept of choice. The
highest rates of unwanted pregnancies and abortions and the lowest rates
of contraceptive use are correlated with income.8 By contrast, at the other
end of the reproductive continuum, for the 6 percent of American couples who cope with infertility, and for those with sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources, the quest for a child is truly a voluntary undertaking that may
result in either assisted reproductive technology or adoption.9 The choice
to become a parent thus has different meanings, depending on the class
of the parents.10
Although virtually all American women will use some form of contraception during their lifetimes, there remains enormous variation in contraceptive use/nonuse among sexually active men and women. Wealthy
and more educated women are more likely to consistently use birth control:
19 percent of wealthier women (at 250 percent of the poverty line), compared to 29 percent of women living in poverty, did not use contraceptives
for some period during a year; and 15 percent of college graduates, compared to 36 percent of those with less than a high school education, did
8. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Family Classes (unpublished manuscript 2009).
9. See Naomi Cahn, Test Tube Families: Why the Fertility Market Needs Legal
Regulation (2009): Debora Spar, The Baby Business (2007); Naomi Cahn & Jennifer
Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 501 (2009)(discussing some of the
anger at Nadya Suleman).
10. For general histories of both birth control and birth-enhancing technologies, see
Debora Spar & and Anna Harrington, Selling Stem Cell Science: How Markets Drive Law
along the Technological Frontier, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 541 (2007).
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not use contraceptives during the same period.11 Women who are uninsured are almost twice as likely as privately insured women to go without
contraceptives for a period of one year.12
Abortion is, similarly, a class issue. Poor women are more likely to get an
abortion than wealthier women. For poor women, the tradeoffs between access to contraception, abortion, and unintended births are acute. The
Guttmacher Institute reports, for example, that at the turn of the century
the “unintended pregnancy rate rose 29 percent among women living below
the poverty level and 26 percent among women living between 100 percent
and 200 percent of the poverty level, but fell 20 percent among more afﬂuent women.”13 Moreover, for poor women, the proportion of unintended
pregnancies that resulted in live births increased by almost 50 percent between 1994 and 2001, while it declined slightly for wealthier women during
the same period.14 The rates also rose for high school dropouts and for
women between the ages of nineteen and twenty-four, while declining for
adolescents and college graduates. These differences reﬂect access and use of
contraception.
Medicaid, the federal program that provides funding for health care for
very poor Americans, provides no funding for abortion except, according
to the 1977 Hyde Amendment, in cases of rape, incest, or life endangerment to the mother. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld restrictions on poor women’s ability to obtain abortions, ﬁrst deciding in 1977
that a state need not pay for medically necessary abortions, and then upholding the Hyde Amendment three years later.15 The consequence is that
the 40 percent of poor women who are covered by Medicaid do not receive federal funding if they need an abortion. Somewhere from one-ﬁfth

11. Guttmacher Institute, Improving Access to Contraceptive Care 3 (2008), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/05/09/ImprovingContraceptiveUse.pdf (last visited
Dec. 7, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Heather D. Boonstra et al., Abortion in Women’s Lives 26 (Guttmacher Institute
2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf (last visited
Dec. 7, 2009).
14. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended
Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 90, 93
(2006).
15. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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to one-third of women on Medicaid who wanted an abortion could not
afford to obtain one.16
To call the entry into parenthood voluntary for many of these women
(and men) recognizes that the decision to engage in sexual activity is typically consensual, but the decision to become pregnant does not necessarily
have the same indicia of choice. Moreover, the authors are somewhat cavalier in their suggestion of what women might do if contraception fails:
abortion is not always easily available nor an acceptable outcome, and
adoption is an emotionally difﬁcult process that has historically had different meanings in different communities.17 If Professors Markel, Collins, and
Leib want to retain voluntariness as an element, then their analysis should
account for the class-based nature of the choice to become a parent.
As for the state’s interest in imposing different rules based on family, we
can start with the state’s parens patriae interest in protecting children, and
then continue with the various state interests in supporting family (with
“family” broadly deﬁned). Although the state’s role within the family can
easily be criticized—it has privileged discrimination within the family, it
has fostered patriarchal relationships, and it has harmed children18—its
role can be positive throughout the family life cycle.19
I I . A N D W H AT A B O U T I N C E S T ?

Second, even without a voluntariness standard, I entirely agree that the
four crimes singled out by Markel, Collins, and Leib—“parental responsibility laws (based on strict and vicarious liability), bigamy, adultery, and
16. http://www.hyde30years.nnaf.org/resources/guttmacher_public_fund.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2009). Some of these women are, however, luckier than others if they live in
one of the seventeen states that covers medically necessary abortions with state funds.
Guttmacher Institute, State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid (2009), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contraceptive_serv.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2009).
17. See, e.g., Rickie Solinger, Wake Up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race Before
Roe v. Wade (1992); Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (1985); Kristin
Luker, When Sex Goes to School: Warring Views on Sex—and Sex Education—Since the
Sixties (2007); Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 17 Wis. Women’s L.J. 263 (2002).
18. For a critique of various biases within the state’s deﬁnition of family, see Markel et
al., supra note 1, at 84.
19. See.,e.g., Linda McClain, The Place of Families (2007); or Huntington, Repairing
Family Law; Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology into
Family Law, 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 385 (2009).
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nonpayment of parental support”—should satisfy a family ties burden
analysis of decriminalization for reasons that are discussed below.20 I also
agree that ﬁlial responsibility laws are questionable; in our culture, it is the
parents who are responsible for their children, and any effort to reverse the
ﬂow of money seems designed to circumvent state responsibility.21 But
their list of potential candidates for decriminalization includes (albeit with
some caveats) one crime that raises critical issues: incest between adults.22
This second section of the essay sketches out the justiﬁcation for continuing to sanction incest , a justiﬁcation that is based on an examination of
the interdependencies created within a family.
Many states have criminalized incestuous relationships based on both consanguinity and afﬁnity.23 In the civil context, states may bar siblings who are related by adoption, rather than by blood, from marrying.24 Particularly in a
post-Lawrence world, many thoughtful commentators have challenged the continued existence of a criminal incest ban.25 Although there is no debate over
20. They state: “On the burdens side of the ledger, we support decriminalization in the cases
of parental responsibility laws (based on strict and vicarious liability), bigamy, adultery, and
nonpayment of parental support; we endorse decriminalizing incest between most adults,
though we are divided on certain subissues in the incest context; and we are highly skeptical of
criminalization in the nonpayment of child support context, though we concede that more research needs to be done on just how effective criminalization is in achieving compliance. The
only area in which we are largely unconﬂicted about criminalization on the burden side is the
omissions (duty to rescue) context.” Markel et al., supra note 1, at 150.
21. For an analogous claim about common law marriage, see Cynthia Grant Bowman,
A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 Or. L. Rev. 709 (1996).
22. They explain: “we think that in situations where genuine and mature consent between
the parties is possible and where negative externalities can be eliminated, the criminal law
should prescind from application” (119).
23. But see Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 2004) (dismissing an incest indictment in a case involving a sexual relationship between a sixty-year-old stepfather
and his sixteen-year-old stepdaughter because of lack of blood relationship).
24. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 Duke L.J. 1077,
1139–46 (2003).
25. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court’s reasoning would call into question the constitutionality of “criminal laws
against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity”); see also Brett
H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 337, 348–55 (2004) (asking
whether, after Lawrence, consensual adult incest falls within the zone of intimate behavior
covered by the Constitution’s guarantee of liberty); see Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving
Incest Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2464, 2465–76 (2006)
(suggesting that incest bans that criminalize sexual relationships between certain relatives,
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the need to criminalize parent-child sexual relationships,26 there are questions about sexual intimacies outside of that core relationship. Professor
Courtney Cahill “propose[s] that the law reappraise the extent to which
disgust, rather than reasoned argument, sustains laws directed at sexual
and familial choice.”27 She notes that “the incest taboo has continued to
provide the language—or grammar—in which we articulate and ‘speak
about’ the family.”28 Professors Markel, Collins, and Leib argue that consensual sexual relationships between adults, which might otherwise be
subject to incest laws, should be decriminalized, and to the extent that
there is abuse in these relationships, non-family-based criminal laws
should apply. Even they, however, would “agree that when sexual misconduct occurs in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency, a sentencing enhancement is warranted for the breach of trust created by that

whether consensual or nonconsensual, are based on traditional heterosexual norms of marriage and family and “undermine a consistent, consent-based scheme for enforcing incest
prohibitions”). Brenda J. Hammer, Note, Tainted Love: What the Seventh Circuit Got
Wrong in Muth v. Frank, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 1065, 1097 (2007) (questioning an incest ban
as applied to a consensual adult relationship where the adults were not raised together
as children). There were questions even before Lawrence. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson,
Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 709, 758–65 (2002)
(questioning civil marital incest prohibitions).
26. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating the Danger
Posed by a Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings, 51 Emory L.J. 241 (2002)
(discussing father-daughter incest, and noting that when one child is molested, there is a
high risk of additional siblings being sexually abused); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Removing Violent Parents from the Home: A Test Case for the Public Health Approach,
12 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 638, 665 (2005) (arguing that intrafamilial dynamics of potential
abuse and exploitation provide a signiﬁcant justiﬁcation for the continuation of the incest
ban; although these intrafamilial dynamics are less important when the children are raised
in separate families, there are additional justiﬁcations for continuing to ban incest in this
circumstance); see also Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The
Criminal Justice System’s Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 Iowa L.
Rev. 131, 145–49, 166 (2007) (suggesting that, where it is available, prosecutors may ﬁle
criminal charges under the lesser penalties applicable to incest rather than to child sexual
abuse, and arguing that this privileges parent offenders). For further discussion of the incest ban, see Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—or the Curtain?—for
Reproductive Technology, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 59 (2009).
27. Courtney Megan Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the
Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the
Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543, 1547 (2005).
28. Cahill, id., at 1610.
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dependency” (126). But they have their limits. The authors explain that
they favor a rule
that prohibits sexual relations between an adult and any person for
whom the adult provides caregiving functions, such that the other person is involved in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency—regardless of
consanguinity. Examples of asymmetrical dependents include, on the one
hand, foster parents, adoptive parents, step-parents, and biological parents,
and on the other hand, all minors under their charge and responsibility.
Our concern is that the relationship of asymmetrical dependency lends itself to peculiar risks of abuse such that establishing a norm of protecting
vulnerable persons from coercion or improper pressure requires a rule that
may be over-protective in some cases (120–21).

Once the parties become adults, however, the authors are far less troubled,
although they would impose a few bars such as, for example, a requirement for “registering the relationship with the government if it ﬁts into a
certain category of risk, and requiring participants to the relationship to
take a sex-education course” (121 n. 72).29
Incest laws can reinforce the traditional nuclear family form through a
deﬁnition based on family form.30 For example, as the authors point out,
incest laws would not protect a child with gay or lesbian parents from sexual relations with the nonbiological parent, where the state does not allow
same-sex marriage or provide legal recognition to the second parent’s relationship with the child.31 The incest prohibition does proscribe some
seemingly consensual private relationships, breaching the sphere of privacy that surrounds intimate sexual conduct.32 Nonetheless, it remains
29. Markel, Collins, and Leib acknowledge some lack of uniformity among them on
these issues (e.g., supra note 1, 93 n.36, 150).
30. See Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1253 (2009).
31. They observe: “Thus, if a gay couple lives in a state where they cannot adopt as a couple together, then the incest statute will not ‘protect’ a child who has been adopted by X
against the sexual misconduct perpetrated by X’s partner, Y—assuming that Y has not been
able to create a legally binding relationship to the child.” Markel et al., supra note 1, at 125.
32. The exact nature of this privacy remains contested. See, e.g, Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 1893 (2004); Linda C McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality
and Responsibility (2006); see also State v. Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512 (Ohio 2007) (Lawrence
does not invalidate state law criminalizing consensual adult incest when the statute is
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critical to recognize the uniqueness of the breach of trust between family
members that occurs if these family members engage in sexual relationships, even when the family members are adults. This breach of trust occurs regardless of how one deﬁnes (or should deﬁne) family, because the
breach involves an abuse of power within an intimate relationship.33
Although I agree that “heightened penalties [may be appropriate] in any
context where a breach of trust with a supervisory adult arises—whether
schools, churches, or the home” (122), the breach of trust that occurs between a minor child and a parent deserves the most stringent and harshest
sanctions; with that recognition, it becomes easier to justify sanctions (albeit not as severe and perhaps not even criminal34) on adult relationships
that span generations: those between parents and children and aunts/uncles
and nieces/nephews.
Given that incest typically occurs between a younger woman and an
older man, generally of a different generation (but sometimes not),35 I remain concerned about power asymmetries in these relationships.
Moreover, an assumption that intrafamilial dependencies created during
childhood can become sufﬁciently untangled so that adult consent becomes meaningful reveals a very “thin” and almost bloodless concept of
the complexity of emotional bonds within families. Although incest typically carries a lesser penalty than does the crime of child sexual abuse,36 it
should instead be deﬁned as the most serious form of child sexual abuse,
with enhanced punishment.
Achieving adulthood does not necessarily remove the vulnerability that
was initially created during infancy and childhood. Incest may be among the
applied to stepfather and stepdaughter), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 94 (2007); Terry
Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect Adults who Adopt
Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution? 32 Hamline L. Rev. 95
(2009).
33. See, e.g, Lisa Haberman, The Seduction of Power: An Analogy of Incest and
Antebellum Slavery, 13 Hastings Women’s L.J. 307, 317 (2002); Jocelyn Ho, Note, Incest
and Sex Offender Registration: Who is Registration Helping and Who is it Hurting?,
14 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 429, 444 (2008)
34. To be sure, the authors acknowledge that they are limiting their analysis to criminal law; supra note 1, at 127.
35. Most reported criminal cases involve father-daughter sexual relationships. See, e.g.,
Ho, supra note 33, at 433.
36. Jennifer C. Mitchell, Note, Crime Without Punishment: How the Legal System is
Failing Child Victims of Intra-Familial Abuse, 9 J.L. Fam. Stud. 413 (2007).
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few sexual relationships that should be expressly prohibited, regardless of
consent. Similarly, intimate relationships characterized by domestic violence
involve an element of involuntariness; battered women ﬁnd it hard to leave.

I I I . S P E C I A L T R E AT M E N T

Third and ﬁnally, rather than presumptions against special treatment of
the family, I would turn this around to a presumption for special treatment, albeit with a revised and more open deﬁnition of family that would
include gay and lesbian intimate relationships as well as single parenthood.
On this broader deﬁnition of what constitutes a family, I’m in good company because this is also important to the authors.
Although I’m willing to allow an opt-out provision, the presumption is
that anyone in a familial-type relationship has opted in to a series of special obligations. Even if we agree that that stringent justiﬁcation for criminal justice intervention is essential, this must involve a recognition that
the family is different. There is something special about the family that adds
a complexity to this analysis: it is the expectation of trust that is inherent in
our notion of family/hearth. That is the vision the law is imposing—
regardless of the form of family that is protected.
To show how this added layer helps provide more texture, consider domestic violence. The Coda discusses the special case of domestic violence,
as does the section on child abuse and neglect, and the book alleges that
the law seems to assume domestic violence is worse than other kinds of violence. In some ways it is because of the abuse of trust. The long history
of the legal treatment of domestic violence in this country, however, shows
that the law has not treated domestic violence as seriously as other crimes,
and suggests that advocacy efforts have sought to ensure that domestic
violence is actually treated similarly to other crimes.37 Domestic violence
should, however, be treated differently from other violent crimes not involving family members. Indeed, one of the “important questions that are
beyond the scope of [the book’s] limited efforts” is how “criminalization
may itself be threatening to women’s autonomy” (153). Surely this is not a
question that would be asked about other violent crimes; we would not suggest that criminalizing violence “may itself be threatening to [the victim’s]
37. See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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autonomy.” Yet, given the nature of domestic violence, this is a legitimate
inquiry. Obviously, domestic violence presents a complex set of issues with
respect to criminalization within the family.
A history of domestic violence provides the context, showing the efforts to
have the crime treated equally with violence outside the family relationship.
When I ﬁrst began representing victims of domestic violence, the conventional advice to victims was not to tell the police that they were being assaulted by a family member. Police departments receive more calls
reporting domestic violence than any other type of crime, and responses
to these calls account for one-third of all police time. Yet, historically, police departments have been reluctant to intervene by making arrests for
domestic violence. For example, a 1984 study found that the typical police
response to these calls was to do nothing but talk to the batterer; a similar study in 1985 reported that, even in incidents where the victim had
been severely injured, 50 percent of the ofﬁcers interviewed would not arrest the abuser.38 Reacting to pressure from battered women’s advocates
and to many civil lawsuits successfully challenging police policies and
conduct, by the 1980s, several jurisdictions had started to enact legislation
requiring changes in arrest policies for domestic violence offenses.
One of the earlier, and most signiﬁcant, cases involving a civil challenge
to a police domestic violence policy was Thurman v. City of Torrington.39
Between early October 1982 and June 1983, the police department ignored
Thurman’s repeated requests for help in protecting her and her child from
her husband’s threats. At one point, a police ofﬁcer watched as her husband kicked her in the head twice. Not until he approached her while she
was lying on a stretcher did the police arrest him. In her lawsuit, she
claimed that her constitutional rights had been violated by the “nonperformance or malperformance of ofﬁcial duties by the defendant police ofﬁcers” and the city. The court held that “[a] man is not allowed to physically
abuse or endanger a woman merely because he is her husband,” and that a
police ofﬁcer may not “‘automatically decline to make an arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other’” (internal citation omitted). The jury awarded Thurman approximately $2.3 million for
38. Catherine Popham Durant, Note, When to Arrest: What Inﬂuences Police Determination to Arrest When There is a Report of Domestic Violence?, 12 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s
Stud. 301, 305–06 (2003).
39. 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1524, 1528 (D. Conn. 1984).
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the police department’s failure to respond to her repeated requests for
assistance.
Thurman established that “the police policy of treating women and
children abused by male relatives or friends differently from persons assaulted by strangers constituted sex discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause.”40 After additional lawsuits were brought around the
country, and as a result of direct pressure from women’s advocates,
many police departments and legislatures developed new arrest policies
for domestic violence offenses.
Once mandatory arrest laws were put in place, many domestic violence
advocates addressed a second part of the criminal justice problem: the practices of prosecutors. Depending on the jurisdiction, prosecutors dismissed
between 50 and 80 percent of domestic violence cases. However, as the
numbers of domestic violence arrests have increased, many prosecutors
have begun to endorse “no-drop” policies.41 A no-drop policy means that it
is the prosecutor’s decision, not the victim’s, whether or not to proceed
with the prosecution of a domestic violence case. Hard no-drop jurisdictions require prosecutors to pursue the cases regardless of the victims’
wishes and may also require victims to testify, even if they need to be subpoenaed to appear. Soft no-drop jurisdictions encourage victims to participate but allow prosecutors some discretion to drop, depending on the
extent of victims’ participation.42
Proponents of no-drop policies claim that domestic violence is a public issue, and that it should be the responsibility of the state, rather than victims,
to hold abusers accountable for their actions; and that aggressive no-drop
policies remove the burden of going forward from the victim because, unlike
in civil actions, she is not the moving party who must then litigate the case.43

40. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 1657, 1668 (2004).
41. Deborah Epstein, Margaret E. Bell, and Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming Aggressive
Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Cases, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 465, 466 (2003).
42. Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the
Sound of Silence, 2009 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 11–12.
43. Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse
Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 Drake L. Rev.
295, 317–20 (2004); Kalyani Robbins, Note, No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence:
Just Good Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1999).
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On the other hand, opponents of no-drop policies argue that the policies serve to deprive a victim of her right to autonomous decisionmaking
about her options, and may actually place her in further danger if the
abuser decides to blame the victim for the criminal proceedings.
Opponents also argue that no-drop policies may force the victim to feel a
lack of control over the situation, and that, somewhat ironically, she may actually be reluctant to call the police for help if the jurisdiction has adopted
a no-drop policy.44

I V. C O N C L U S I O N

The historical treatment of domestic violence has made family ties into a
burden for victims and a beneﬁt for perpetrators. On the criminal side, advocates have pushed for domestic violence to be treated like any other
crime, even as they have argued for special treatment for victims. On the
civil side, advocates have pushed for different treatment of domestic
violence, with civil protection orders now available in all states to anyone
who is being abused by an intimate partner.
Domestic violence actually presents two separate sets of issues: ﬁrst, it
shows how some crimes really are different because of the abuse of trust;
and second, it shows the importance of considering the rights and interests in the criminal justice system of people other than the defendant.
Markel, Collins, and Leib are exactly right on the effect of criminalization:
as they point out, family ties benefits and burdens implicate collective
visions of the family and defendants’ rights. In addition, the approach of
the criminal justice system to family ties burdens and beneﬁts also implicates the rights and interests of others with strong interests in the criminal
justice system: victims, for example, whose voices do not appear at trial.
Consider the allegation of some that mandatory arrest or prosecutory nodrop policies may privilege the interests of policymakers acting on behalf
of battered women over the interests of individual women in their own
agency and autonomy.45 Focusing on the defendant alone in the context of
44. See Mordini, id.
45. See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic
Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 Hous. L. Rev.
237, 281 (2005); Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should the Police Respond to Domestic
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family ties burdens overlooks the very reasons for the extra burdens or beneﬁts. That is, it is because of the defendant’s relationships that some of
these actions become crimes; looking at the effect of the defendant’s actions
might become an appropriate way to take into account family ties burdens
in order to administer justice within the criminal law system.46 We might
seek to develop new policies that allow victims control over choices in the
criminal justice and mediation system because of their family ties.47
Family status brings both beneﬁts and burdens outside of the legal system.48 Acknowledging that family status brings both beneﬁts and burdens
within the legal system shows how the law can accommodate, and account
for, the messy complexities of family life.

Violence: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandatory Arrest, 39 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 765, 779–80 (1999); Sara R. Benson, Failure to Arrest: A Pilot Study of Police
Response to Domestic Violence in Rural Illinois, 17 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 685
(2009). Professor Sally Goldfarb argues that the law should craft responses to domestic violence that recognize that a woman may not leave a battering relationship because she “has
a deep emotional bond with her partner and wants to preserve and improve the relationship.” Sally Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can
Law Help End the Abuse without Ending the Relationship?, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1487, 1499
(2008).
46. For arguments about expanding our notions of justice and accountability within
the international criminal system, see Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Naomi Cahn, & Dina Haynes,
Returning Home: Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction and Gender (forthcoming 2010).
47. Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, Fla. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
48. As a beneﬁt, consider eligibility for health care insurance based on family status; as
a burden, consider Romeo and Juliet who, because of their families’ feuds, were doomed.
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D I S C R E T I O N A RY P O L I CY A R G U M E N T S
Gabriel J. Chin*

Being a parent, spouse, or sibling, we learn, has a pervasive effect on criminal liability. Family status is an element of criminal defenses (e.g., exemption from liability for harboring a fugitive if the fugitive is a relative),
evidentiary rules (e.g., spousal privilege), and crimes (e.g., nonsupport of
spouse, children, or parents). Blood ties can transform otherwise innocent
behavior into a criminal offense, and vice versa. Of course, scholars, policymakers, and lawyers knew about these laws individually. But collecting
them and explaining their effects on liability and criminal procedure from
bail to sentencing offers an important insight. This alone renders Privilege
or Punish a worthy accomplishment; it represents discovery of a new facet
of criminal law that had until now had been hiding in plain sight.
The book also proposes reforms, identifying principles it contends should
guide policymakers’ reevaluation of family status beneﬁts and family status
burdens. The book is bracingly clear. Its discussion of family status beneﬁts
and burdens are structured the same way. First, a chapter describes the law.
The next chapter proposes principles for evaluating the law, including equality, accuracy, and incentivizing desirable behavior. A third chapter proposes
reform based on inconsistencies between principles and law, such as ending
preferences now available only to heterosexual families based on the principle
of equality. By focusing on law reform and policy, the book explicitly targets
“public policy makers, lawyers and legislators” as well as scholars.1
*Chester H. Smith Professor of Law, Professor of Public Administration and Policy,
and Director, Program in Criminal Law and Policy, University of Arizona. Email: gchin@
aya.yale.edu.
1. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, & Ethan J. Leib, Privilege or Punish: Criminal
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, xiv (2009). The book may be an example of a
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 13, Number 1, pps 142–150. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-4206. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content
through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.
ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2010.13.1.142.
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The book reﬂects expertise, conﬁdence, and careful analysis—which
makes the tentative, conditional nature of many of its reforms a surprise:
maybe immunity from harboring a fugitive should be eliminated, the book
argues; probably spousal privileges are undesirable. Most of the book’s normative assumptions are widely shared, such as promoting accuracy, deterring crime, and promoting law-abiding behavior. Yet even a legislator who
fully embraces the values and principles animating the policy proposals will
ﬁnd that the proposals are something short of a Model Act.
Part of this ﬂows from the book’s candid explanation of the basis for its
conclusions. It explicitly relies on empirical evidence as well as, sometimes,
empirical assumptions, and acknowledges that its recommendations might
change if the real world is not as it assumes. Privilege or Punish also recognizes that “there are multiple considerations that will be relevant to policymakers beyond our presumptions and analyses.”2
Policy proposals must be accepted by policymakers to become policy. If
justice and sound public policy require analysis of multiple factors, it
would be helpful for a prescriptive analysis such as this to offer guidance
on how to do it. It would also be helpful to distinguish outcomes that are
dictated by principle or fact from those that are preferred by an author but
could legitimately be rejected in favor of another approach.
The critical audience is the group that agrees at the level of principle, but
at the moment disagrees or is unconvinced about the particular outcome.
Those who disagree about premises are hopeless; someone convinced that
Loving v. Virginia was wrongly decided is not susceptible to an argument,
no matter how carefully crafted, that prohibition of gay marriage is indistinguishable from antimiscegenation laws. At the other end of the
spectrum, those who already agree that prohibition of gay marriage is discriminatory need not be persuaded with analogies or arguments. Thus as
a policy proposal, the task of this book is to convince those who share the
principles of the authors (who are against patriarchy and heteronormativity and for equality, who are for accuracy and justice in the sense of conviction of the guilty, and who also support liberal minimalism, use of the

turn to policy in criminal law scholarship. There is a central place for pure theory, but one
of the disappointments of criminal law scholarship of the past century is how little impact
it has had on criminal law. Darryl K. Brown, History’s Challenge to Criminal Law Theory,
3 Crim. L. & Phil. 271 (2009).
2. Markel, supra note 1, at 36.

143

NCLR1301_06.qxd

144

|

2/1/10

5:54 PM

Page 144

N E W C R I M I N A L L AW R E V I E W

|

VO L. 13

|

NO. 1

|

WINTER 2010

criminal sanction only when necessary) but who are not already convinced
that family relations should normally not be used to assign criminal beneﬁts and burdens.
Policy prescriptions might be divided into three categories. The ﬁrst are
rules applicable (or prohibited) with little attention to external or empirical
considerations. They are based on principle. A rule might be prohibited by
the Constitution no matter how desirable it may seem, or by a moral constraint, such as a prohibition on intentionally harming innocents or discriminating on the basis of religion, even if it promised substantial practical
rewards. If nonarbitrariness is a value, consistency with precedent or obedience to the decision of a higher court might legitimately dictate an outcome
in the absence of overriding considerations—even if the controlling decision
itself could reasonably have been decided the other way. A rule of this type
might be a prohibition on privileges available only to heterosexual couples
or on burdens imposed only on gay families. Policymakers opposed to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation do not need to know the practical precise consequences of a discriminatory policy to conclude that it
should be prohibited.
A second category of rules or policies apply, determinatively, based on
empirical considerations. For example, imagine a jurisdiction where the
law requires setting bail in an amount necessary to ensure appearance at
future proceedings.3 Research may show whether (or when) family connections make defendants less likely to ﬂee. If the evidence shows that factor reduces risk, it should be considered in setting bail. If that factor does
not reduce risk, it should not be considered.
But a subset of these kinds of rules presents a problem. These are rules
that are potentially, but have not been, empirically resolved. What are
courts to do if data could be generated to resolve a particular issue, but has
not, or if data are unreliable or uncertain? For two reasons, it is insufﬁcient
to say that these questions should simply be answered through research.
First, lack of determinate data does not let judges off the hook; judges
must either consider, or not consider, family status in setting bail in every
single bail decision. However, the theory could provide that governments
should be required to generate the data on this (and of course all other
similar issues) as quickly as possible, so that going forward, decisions
would be made on the correct basis.
3. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7(b).
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But this would impose a cost. As important as it is, in general, that cases
be decided fairly, accurately, and on reasonable grounds, it is also true that
not every unreasonable distinction itself causes more harm than it would
cost to ﬁx it. Assume, for example, that the standard ﬁne for an “open
container” violation is $25 in a particular jurisdiction. It might be that, for
$1,000 or so per case, courts could come up with more precisely tailed
sanctions; based on prior conduct and impact on the community, a range
of sanctions from $10 to $50 might be imposed. However, many would
doubt that that particular expenditure would most efﬁcaciously promote
justice or reduce injustice. If determinative empirical information can be
obtained only at substantial expense, a challenger of the status quo should
propose that the cost of ﬁnding the truth is outweighed by the injustice or
unfairness that would result if the good faith, best guess is wrong. Put
another way, the typical practice of sentencing people convicted of serious
crimes to incarceration for years and months (and often in round numbers), as opposed to differentiating down to minutes and seconds, reﬂects
an implicit and appropriate acceptance of the idea that justice will be doled
out as the best available approximation rather than as an exact quantity.
The legal system can make no pretense to precise reﬂection of culpability
such that, for example, it is not possible for a more serious offender to receive a greater sentence than a less serious offender in particular cases.
A third category of outcomes are not dictated, because a range of responses are consistent with principle and knowable facts (that is, are not
inconsistent with justice or sound policy). Policy analysis is helpful in this
area because it can highlight the costs, beneﬁts, interests, values, and other
considerations that policymakers should use to choose from among reasonable alternatives. Policy analysis can also identify the parameters beyond
which policy would become unsound.
An author may have a recommendation for a problem of this type. But
if it is simply a value choice from among several alternatives that would be
equally legitimate, as some of the prescriptions of Privilege or Punish are,
it would be useful to distinguish them from rules urged more forcefully.
Choice, discretion, even indulgence of preferences and speculation may be
unavoidable with respect to problems that are essentially political, or require
weighing incommensurable factors.
If I were in the legislature, I would vote for most of the book’s policy
prescriptions. Yet I am uncertain how many, if any, are obligatory even on
those who share the author’s premises. It may be that no policy proposals
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correct blunders4—i.e., laws that are contrary to principle or indisputably
empirically unjustiﬁable based on their acknowledged purposes.
One proposal with which I disagree is the book’s critique of evidentiary
privileges. Many jurisdictions prohibit both: (1) one spouse from testifying
against another during the marriage, and (2) a current or former spouse
from testifying about the content of a communication that took place during the marriage.5 Spouses, then, have protection from inquiry that many
others do not enjoy. Privilege or Punish opposes these privileges: “it is our
view that the family neither needs nor deserves any special protection when
the smooth and fair administration of criminal justice is at stake.”6 I claim
to share most of the values of the authors, yet disagree with their conclusion
because I contest some of their empirical assumptions, and with how the
values at stake should be weighed.
The book observes that spousal privilege is rooted in patriarchy; when
the wife was merged into the husband’s legal personality, allowing her to
testify against him would have been tantamount to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. But “the testimonial privileges have been
modernized in most places to defang their patriarchal origins;”7 equal protection law since the 1970s would prohibit a husband-only privilege. If “[i]t
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that . . . it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV,”8 it is equally unwise to discard sensible ideas because they date to unenlightened times.9 That Kim Jong Il likes
Elizabeth Taylor movies says nothing about the merits of National Velvet.10

4. Other than the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
which will be accepted by all who agree with the principle.
5. Both are subject to exceptions, for example, suits based on intrafamily offenses or
suits by one spouse against another.
6. Markel, supra note 1, at 38.
7. Markel, supra note 1, at 39.
8. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
9. For example, I would not propose to eliminate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment even though Dred Scott correctly concluded that it was drafted in part to protect ownership interests in slaves.
10. http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0453535/bio. I bridle also at the argument that
spousal privilege operates “in a male friendly manner: men commit more crime, so it will
beneﬁt men more often if their spouses (or mothers or sisters) are prevented from testifying against them”; Markel, supra note 1, at 39. This argument proves too much, suggesting that any proprosecution legal rule, from eliminating juries to cutting back on indigent
defense, is feminist because, after all, most defendants are male. One might as well say that
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The question of whether facially neutral spousal privilege perpetuates
patriarchy is exceedingly difﬁcult. Perhaps the most excruciating context
involves an alleged victim of spousal abuse who does not wish to testify
against her husband. Which outcome is antipatriarchal: allowing her to
choose not to speak, when the choice may be coerced and the failure of a
prosecution may expose her to future violence, or forcing her to testify,
thus overriding a choice that may be her own, and compelling testimony
that may result in violence against her, or in jail or other penalties for noncompliance? Conceivably, some experiment or data collection could deﬁnitively show which rule best promoted, say, victim safety. But even then,
the formulation of a legal rule would require comparing incommensurables, such as the value of victim autonomy to the value of prosecution,
and those agreeing on facts and underlying principles of justice might still
disagree about the best rule.
The book is also concerned with evidence lost by keeping spouses off
the stand. The argument is framed in terms both of sound criminal justice policy and of equality. Eliminating the privilege would generate more
evidence. But if, as the book recognizes is possible, family privileges “function to prevent family members from lying on the stand,”11 then the privilege advances, rather than impedes, the search for truth. The privilege
may incentivize more crime by reassuring potential participants in family
conspiracies. But a spousal conspirator could invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination rather than spousal privilege, and a criminal conspirator likely has an above-average propensity to perjury. Accordingly, excusing such a witness might have little probative cost, or even be a net truth
enhancer. It is not out of the question that the reason for the continued
vitality of the rule is that legislatures, knowing that this type of evidence
was generally not valuable, prophylactically prevented litigants from wasting their time pursuing evidence that experience shows is not likely to be
forthcoming.
because most legislators, judges, and prosecutors are male, anything prodefendant is
antipatriarchal. And of course, every acquittal of a man potentially beneﬁts female mothers, sisters, and spouses.
It is also untenable for the book to argue that the spousal privilege beneﬁts men, yet
promotes interfamily conspiracies; Markel, supra note 1, at 41. At least while the privileges
are heterosexual-only and apply to spouses, in every interfamily conspiracy, at least one
conspirator, and hence beneﬁciary of the rule, will be female.
11. Markel, supra note 1, at 40.
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We also do not know much about the types of cases in which the privilege keeps witnesses off the stand. How many prosecutions are derailed
by the privilege, and in what kinds of cases? If many murderers are unprosecuted every year because of the rule, that has a far different implication than if almost all serious cases are able to proceed based on other
evidence.
But even if these possibly intractable empirical questions are resolvable and
show that privileges impede accurate verdicts, they still might be justiﬁable.
One goal of criminal law is to express and thus reinforce community values. The idea that spousal privilege encourages married criminals to share
their plans presumes that the existence of the privilege is widely known
outside of the legal community. That noncriminal married couples know
they are free to share private thoughts without risk of compelled disclosure, and that all of society knows that the state values and protects this
particular intimate relationship, are goods which must be weighed against
the bad of increased or undetected crime. Even if we could quantify (1) the
crimes created, (2) the crimes that cannot be prosecuted successfully because of the privilege, (3) the crimes dissuaded and the other prosocial
communications fostered, and (4) the effects of knowledge of state support for marriage on the society at large (through, say, MRI studies of the
brain), we still would not have a deﬁnitive answer to the question of
whether the beneﬁt was worth the cost. The policy is neither right nor
wrong but represents a matter of opinion about how much state support
of marriage is worth compared to other valuable ends.
Privilege or Punish also proposes that the privileges implicate equality,
because spouses12 receive a beneﬁt denied to those not coupled. While
true, in the absence of a systematic argument that provision of any beneﬁts to married couples is illegitimate, a legislator sympathetic to the approach could conclude that this accommodation was reasonable. This is
not inequality based on a classiﬁcation that generally should not be the basis of beneﬁts or burdens—e.g., the book does not attack the lower federal
income tax rates for married couples ﬁling jointly. Nor is it inequality about
a right that should be available on the same basis across the board—e.g.,
12. Many Americans including myself believe it is unjust to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples, but this critique is not restricted to criminal law and is associated with a
determinate reform, equalization. The argument assumes that this equality problem has
been resolved.
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the book does not argue that everyone (or no one) should have evidentiary
privileges for private communications. This objection reduces to an argument about particular legal methods of supporting the family, inherently a
matter of judgment and discretion even among policymakers sharing the
same basic values and theoretical approach. Accordingly, it is a substantial
concession for the authors to acknowledge that “there very well may be appropriate places for the modern liberal state to recognize and accommodate
the signiﬁcance of family life and caregiving networks.”13 After that, we are
talking about the price.
To give another example, I question the proposed inclusion of spanking
in criminal assault statutes from the position of devil’s advocate, because I
am not a fan of corporal punishment. But there is a perfectly reasonable
case for leaving genuinely excessive parental discipline to child abuse
statutes while keeping spanking legal.
One argument is from the perspective of liberal minimalism. The authors
want to use the criminal sanction only when it is necessary and its goals cannot be achieved in any other way.14 Why, then, the rush to the criminal code
here? Just as they propose with spousal and child support statutes, and the
prohibition against bigamy, civil regulations can be and are used to deal with
parents who are basically well intentioned but too violent.
Another argument comes from the gulf between criminalization on the
books and suppression of conduct in the world. Is it really likely that we
will see substantial numbers of criminal prosecutions for spanking if it were
criminalized? Because of the difﬁculty of discovery of the offense and prosecutorial discretion, it is probable that few if any parents guilty of simple
13. Markel, supra note 1, at 149.
14. For example, application of the principle of liberal minimalism is unlikely to change
many minds, because almost everyone agrees that the criminal sanction should be used
only when necessary, and almost everyone insists that the criminal laws they support are in
fact necessary. As Professor Brown explained, regarding the persistence of antisodomy laws:
arguments for criminalization of nonprocreative sexual activity were made persuasively to
many within terms of the harm principle. That is, advocates for sodomy laws marshaled reasons
why even private, consensual sodomy does in fact cause grave social harm—because it degrades morality of participants and of society generally, and it contradicts centuries of moral
consensus; because it leads to predatory sexual behavior, especially against children; because it
spreads disease, etc.

Brown, supra note 1, at 281. Liberal minimalism is a device that will identify only nondebatable cases.

NCLR1301_06.qxd

150

|

2/1/10

5:54 PM

Page 150

N E W C R I M I N A L L AW R E V I E W

|

VO L. 13

|

NO. 1

|

WINTER 2010

spanking would be brought to court. If aggressively enforced, we would
risk the same kind of intrusion into private life that the “war on drugs”
has engendered. If unenforced, the law is likely pointless.
Then there is the issue of crafting the law’s terms. It is reasonable to use
physical means of controlling children that would be unreasonable for
adults. A small child standing perilously close to the curb of a busy street,
for example, can permissibly be snatched up; a child can be compelled by
a parent to receive a vaccination, or a spoonful of mashed peas can be gently inserted into a baby’s mouth when he opened it only to squeal. I assume
that the authors would approve of many of these and other nonspanking
physical touchings of children that would constitute assault if done to an
adult.
If the criminal justice system were to address this problem, all we have
is arrest and jail. If a policymaker with other tools were to consider it, she
might conclude that resources would best be deployed to parent and pediatrician education to persuade parents not to spank in the ﬁrst place,
rather than trying to prosecute after the fact.
Even well-developed values and principles, coupled with high-quality
information about the empirical effects of legal rules, will not always lead,
as if mathematically, to a particular code or even a rule on any particular
issue. Once unjust discrimination and unambiguously unwise policies are
eliminated, issues will remain that, consistent with a particular theoretical
approach, can legitimately be resolved in a range of ways.
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Jennifer M. Collins,* Ethan J. Leib,** and Dan Markel ***

We would like to begin by thanking Professors Berman, Cahn, and Chin
for the time and care with which they have engaged our work and for furnishing us with an opportunity to discuss, clarify, and rethink some of the
key claims and concerns associated with our recent book, Privilege or
Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties. Needless to say,
we appreciate their very kind words about our project and its contributions. In this Essay, our focus will be on responding to the interesting criticisms lodged against our book; we hope to do so in a way that is helpful
in advancing the conversation about the intersection between criminal
justice and family status beyond these pages.

I . O N T H E N AT U R E O F P O L I CY A N A LYS I S :
OUTS I D E TH E E M PI R E OF E M PI R ICI S M?

Based on the comments of both Professors Jack Chin and Doug Berman,
it seems appropriate and necessary for us to say a bit more about the
methodology of Privilege or Punish. In particular, we need to highlight and
clarify the role of empirical evidence within the overall project pursued in
the book.

*Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law.
**Visiting Associate Professor of Law, UC-Berkeley; Associate Professor, UC-Hastings
College of the Law.
***D’Alemberte Professor, Florida State University College of Law. We are grateful to
Jack Chin and Holly Grifﬁn for comments and conversations on earlier versions.
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 13, Number 1, pps 151–175. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-4206. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content
through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.
ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2010.13.1.151.
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A. Professor Berman’s “Empirical” Critique

Professor Berman’s critique observes, at the outset, the “extraordinary contribution” our book makes in terms of spotlighting attention on the various
ways the criminal justice system’s laws impose various burdens or beneﬁts
on persons by virtue of their familial status.1 We are relieved to see that acknowledgment—that was our book’s explicit focus. Unfortunately, he
then chides us for not considering the relationship between family status
and “fundamental crime realities,” and for not discussing various studies
identifying patterns of crime connected to the presence or absence of family ties and/or gender dynamics.2 Similarly, Professor Chin notes the contribution the book makes by discovering “a new facet of criminal law that
had until now been hiding in plain sight.”3 But his essay encourages us to
be clearer about the degree to which empirical conclusions are necessary
to reach ﬁrm conclusions regarding the book’s recommendations. These
challenges warrant careful response.
In the Introduction to our book, we speciﬁcally noted that many scholars have tried to look at the empirical issues Professor Berman in particular is interested in, especially with respect to what he calls the “relationship
of family status, gender dynamics and crime.”4 We acknowledged, moreover, the tremendous scholarship cataloguing, among other things, “the
devastating impact that the incarceration of relatives can have on the family members left behind.”5 Furthermore, to the extent such research yields
clear signals, we could not have been more transparent about the need for
these effects to be considered as part of an overall evaluation of criminal
justice policies. As we wrote, “There is no doubt that many of the criminal

1. Douglas A. Berman, Digging Deeper into, and Thinking Better about, the Interplay
of Families and Criminal Justice, 13(1) New Crim. L. Rev. 119 (2010).
2. Id. at 122 (“Privilege or Punish not only fails to engage key sociological and criminogenic realities involving family ties, but it fails even to acknowledge the profound interplay of families ties, gender dynamics, and criminal offending that operate beneath the
formal criminal law doctrines they discuss and assail.”).
3. Gabriel J. Chin, Mandatory, Contingent and Discretionary Policy Arguments, 13(1)
New Crim. L. Rev. 142, 142 (2010).
4. See Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, & Ethan J. Leib, Privilege or Punish: Criminal
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, xiv (2009).
5. Id. (citing, e.g., Donald Braman, Doing Time on the Outside (2004); Sandra Enos,
Mothering from the Inside: Parenting in a Woman’s Prison (2001); Joan Petersilia, When
Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry (2003)).
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law’s policies and practices disadvantage families in many ways—and
without attention to this sort of disparate impact on families, policy designers risk tearing our social fabric at the seams.”6
All that said, we thought we were quite clear that our endeavor had a
different objective. Rather than focus on, for example, the effects on offenders, victims, or third parties associated with “facially neutral” criminal
justice policies, we emphasized that we would focus our attention, using
tools of legal analysis and political theory, on those criminal laws that consciously target defendants for special privileges or burdens on account of
their familial status.7 Contrary to Professor Berman’s claim that this focus
on analysis of criminal law was somehow obscured,8 we said as much on our
book jacket and in our Introduction no less than a handful of times.9
6. Id. For example, the collateral consequences to innocent persons in the context of irreplaceable caregivers motivated our proposal for “time-deferred incarceration.” See id. at 48–53.
7. In terms of family ties beneﬁts, we examined roughly six areas: evidentiary privileges,
exemptions for family members for harboring fugitives, violence within the family, pretrial
release, sentencing discounts based on family ties, and prison policies. In terms of family
ties burdens, we studied seven areas: omissions liability for failure to rescue, parental responsibility laws, incest, bigamy, adultery, nonpayment of child support, and nonpayment
of parental support.
8. See Berman, supra note 1, at 122 (“The authors might respond that their goal was
only to discuss and assess formal doctrines and not real-world outcomes. If so, they at least
should have made this important point clearer in both the title and text.”).
9. The suggestion that our subtitle, which uses the words “criminal justice” (and not
“criminal law”) connotes a dramatically different focus, and that we are somehow being coy
or furtive about our focus, seem rather odd. Professor Berman himself can read what he
quoted from our book earlier in his review: namely, that we focus on the “panoply of laws
expressly drawn to privilege or disadvantage persons based on family status alone,” Markel,
Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at xv. Our Introduction to the book, moreover, is littered with
statements regarding our focus of inquiry. See, e.g., id. at xiii (noting that we are interested
in asking descriptive and normative questions about “the facial treatment of family status”
within the criminal law); id. at xv (“[W]e have chosen here to focus on explicit legislative
or judicial choices to privilege or burden individuals with family relationships.”); id. (“We
believe policymakers need to reﬂect upon the explicit choices they have made, choices that
have been insufﬁciently analyzed in a synthetic manner by academics before this project.
Once we have a framework for analyzing the explicit family ties beneﬁts and burdens, one
might be able to apply elements of that framework to the unstated and more obscured informal beneﬁts and burdens. But to develop that framework in the ﬁrst instance, we focus on facial beneﬁts and burdens.”); id. at xv (“Scholars have been successful in analyzing the effects
of certain criminal justice policies and practices on the family. But most scholars have not recognized the panoply of laws expressly drawn to privilege or disadvantage persons based on
family status alone. Some have addressed singular instances of the larger phenomenon

NCLR1301_07.qxd

154

|

2/23/10

10:38 AM

Page 154

N E W C R I M I N A L L AW R E V I E W

|

VO L. 13

|

NO. 1

|

WINTER 2010

Professor Berman might then say that, even if such a focus on criminal
laws rather than criminal justice outcomes were better articulated, it doesn’t excuse the failure to undertake a more wide-ranging excursion into the
empirical ﬁndings of criminologists who have examined the “relationship
of family status, gender dynamics, and crime.” Our response here has
several layers.
First, when we discovered relevant empirical evidence about the efﬁcacy
associated with the speciﬁc laws and policies we study,10 we cited it and addressed it.11 In various instances, such as the discussion of evidentiary privileges, our conclusions were tempered and more tentative in light of
concerns raised by extant or possible empirical ﬁndings.12 Unsurprisingly,
this sensitivity to the existing evidence and the possibility of confounding
empirical results is noted by Professor Chin in his essay.
Second, it is important to note that, for many of the speciﬁc areas we
studied, we saw no directly relevant empirical research. To illustrate, consider the following: Do states granting exemptions to family members who
harbor fugitives have higher crime rates than states that do not? Do states
with incest, adultery, parental supervision, or parental support laws have
lower rates of crime than those states that don’t? Have states that dropped
family ties burdens experienced a surge in crime or an increase in quality of
family life? Do those states without “family ties beneﬁts” to defendants have any
markers suggesting stronger or weaker family life? Lower or higher crime rates?
Do states with more immunities for spouses get more or less accurate information in criminal justice proceedings? Do immunities lead to what Professor
Berman calls “healthier” or more “wholesome” families? We could go on.
we chart, but we are the ﬁrst to offer a synthetic approach. It seems important and necessary to pause and think through how and why our laws intentionally target family status
and how the underlying goals of such a choice might better be served in some cases. This
book clears that ground.”). Our book jacket’s summary of the book also makes clear that
we are focused on “the panoply of laws (whether statutory or common law–based) expressly drawn to privilege or disadvantage persons based on family status alone.”
10. See supra note 7.
11. E.g., Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 128–35 (discussing empirical studies
associated with polygamy); id. at 189 n.77 (discussing Bedard & Helland’s study showing
that the farther away a prison was located from a female defendant’s family, the greater the
decrease in crime).
12. E.g., id. at 140–44 (discussing deterrence effects associated with criminal laws related to deadbeat parents); id. at 40 (discussing the possibility that evidentiary privileges
protect the criminal trial from being polluted by perjuring family members).
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Importantly, and disappointingly, nothing Professor Berman alludes
to provides an answer to these speciﬁc questions. This should not come
as a surprise. After all, most scholars, whether in law schools or criminology departments, have not studied the effects of most of the laws that
were the focus of our book. Indeed, as Professor Chin avers, most of these
laws were “hiding in plain sight”—and thus obscured from systematic and
synthetic legal analysis, which the book undertakes,13 and empirical study
as well, which the book does not. Thus, for the most part, as nonspecialists in empirical studies, we were left in the position of identifying and encouraging fruitful avenues for further empirical research that would test
our hypotheses about the effects associated with these various family ties
beneﬁts or burdens. Although those tests will have to await future study,
we still believe we have offered useful observations and normative analysis
that could help policymakers process such empirical evidence if it becomes
available.
What’s more, Professor Berman’s scholarly citations, which reﬂect the
predictable gender patterns associated with criminal incidence, are all red
herrings as far as we can tell: he doesn’t identify how any one of them focuses on outcomes related to criminal laws that are creating beneﬁts or
burdens based on legal family status.14 Instead he alludes to research undertaken by criminologists that are part of a “social control” theory meant
to explain what factors reduce crime more generally. But these tactics fail
to directly intersect with the speciﬁc objects of our study. For example,
Professor Berman quotes an article to the effect that
A large body of research in this area reveals many family variables signiﬁcantly related to crime. Most notably, juveniles commit fewer criminal acts
when they are emotionally attached to parents, exposed to consistent
parental supervision, reinforced when they engage in prosocial behavior,
and exposed to consistent, fair, and nonphysical parental discipline.15

13. Importantly, we don’t claim that each of the family ties burdens or beneﬁts was obscured from prior analysis; it would be silly to suggest that incest or evidentiary privileges
for family members were hitherto unexplored. What we hope was innovative about our
efforts was trying to see what connections and critiques can be made by looking at the
various beneﬁts and burdens in tandem and juxtaposition.
14. See generally Berman, supra note 1.
15. Id. at 121 (quoting Carter Hay et al., The Impact of Community Disadvantage on
the Relationship between the Family and Juvenile Crime, 43 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 236,
327–29 (2006).
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Assuming arguendo this is all true, none of it calls into question a single
prescription of ours. After all, we repeatedly acknowledged the role of
families in reducing criminogenesis and in socializing citizens, among
other important tasks.16 We say nothing in our book that casts doubt on
the wisdom of subsidizing family interests through civil institutions of distributive justice that would foster emotional attachment to parents; nothing that denies the beneﬁts of encouraging juveniles to “engage in prosocial
behavior”; and nothing in derogation of “consistent, fair, and nonphysical
parental discipline.” Indeed, we actually express hostility to criminal law defenses that redound to parents when they physically assault their children in
the name of “parental discipline.”17
To challenge any of our particular policy judgments on empirical grounds,
Professor Berman would need some evidence that indicates, or even suggests,
where we were off the mark. But Professor Berman not only fails to adduce
empirical evidence to challenge our prescriptions, he also never challenges the
prescriptive conclusions we draw with respect to a single instance of a burden
or a beneﬁt. Put simply, nothing in his essay gets to the particulars and suggests that the way we would prefer to alter a particular law has been shown
to be antithetical to good “criminal justice outcomes.”
Indeed, as a prescriptive matter, all Professor Berman asseverates is the
following:
As a matter of real-world criminal justice outcomes, it would seem that for
all persons—and perhaps especially for women—healthy, wholesome, and
happy family ties are likely to advance the authors’ asserted normative commitments, while unhealthy, unwholesome, and unhappy family ties are likely
to undermine these normative commitments. If this is true, then it is misguided for the authors to call for a general presumption against both family
status benefits and burdens in the criminal justice system. Preferable would be
a general presumption in favor of beneﬁts for healthy, wholesome and
happy family ties and a general presumption in favor of burdens for unhealthy, unwholesome and unhappy family ties.18
16. See, e.g., Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 25 (“All things being equal, we
do not think states can succeed without being attentive to the way in which selves are constructed through families—and we agree that if states are going to feed on the capacitygenerating beneﬁts families confer, it is not inappropriate for families to demand some
subsidization in return. Families may be labors of love, but they are full of real undercompensated labor all the same.”); see also id. at 53–56 (emphasizing the role family members
and loved ones can play in facilitating successful prisoner reentry).
17. See Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 45–46.
18. Berman, supra note 1, at 156 (emphasis on “general . . . system” added).
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This claim is intriguing but entirely undeveloped. Professor Berman doesn’t specify a single example of a criminal justice policy that would constitute a burden that should be placed on “unhealthy, unwholesome, and
unhappy family ties.” Nor does he identify one beneﬁt that should be enjoyed by defendants in order to cultivate “healthy, wholesome, and happy
family ties.” We also note some discomfort with Professor Berman’s use of
the word “wholesome” here. Who gets to decide whether any particular
family grouping is “wholesome?”19
Interestingly, Professor Berman’s preference to support “healthy” family
ties and burden “unhealthy” ones is nominally juxtaposed against our “general presumption” against the use of family status beneﬁts and burdens.
Although Professor Berman’s review faults us for not having “dug deeper”
into the study of family ties,20 we wish he had read the book’s description of
the “general presumption” more attentively. As the book makes clear in the
Introduction, develops in chapters 2 and 5, and implements in chapters 3
and 6, the general presumption we craft is intended to operate as nothing
more than a speed bump that raises several kinds of reasons to be cautious
about the use of family status. Speciﬁcally, the speed bump forces the policymaker to subject the use of family status in a particular context to something akin to equal protection analysis regarding suspect classiﬁcations.21
The presumption forces the beginning of the inquiry, not the end of it.
Thus, importantly, we did not say that the law should jettison all manifestations of family status in the criminal law.22 Rather, once we see that a
criminal law uses family status, we argue that some scrutiny is warranted
to ensure that the various beneﬁts or burdens are justiﬁable vis-à-vis the
core commitments of an effective and fair criminal law that prioritizes the
security, liberty, and equality of citizens.

19. Moreover, Professor Berman fails to indicate which of the burdens and beneﬁts
we’ve studied would actually help or hinder any families, wholesome or otherwise.
20. See id., “Digging Deeper.”
21. As we explain, we want policymakers, when tempted to use family status as the basis for a beneﬁt or burden, to make sure there is an important or compelling objective and
that the means adopted to pursue that objective are “narrowly tailored” to achieve that objective, looking especially to see whether alternative measures might be effective, such as a
focus on function rather than status. Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at xvii.
22. See, e.g., id. at 103 (arguing that we should preserve status-based duties to rescue for
parents or spouses as a strong presumption that is overcome when parents terminate rights
or when spouses divorce).
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As we summarize in our Coda, some of the family ties beneﬁts or burdens
should be eliminated, while others can be plausibly justiﬁed once they are
re-tailored in a manner that is less likely to raise concerns that the beneﬁts
or burdens are operating in ways that denigrate people living outside the
traditional paradigm of heterosexual and repronormative families. As we
noted above, Professor Berman doesn’t challenge the result or reasoning of
any of the applications of the general presumption.
B. Professor Chin’s Plea for Clarity Regarding Empirical Values

The preceding discussion vis-à-vis Professor Berman helps set the stage for
our response to one of the critiques by Professor Chin, who helpfully does
focus attention on one of our policy assessments regarding intrafamilial
testimonial privileges. Before we engage that speciﬁc disagreement, however, Professor Chin raises a larger challenge: namely, he asks that we specify more clearly which of our policy conclusions would be better analyzed
with more empirical information, and which ones are impervious to more
data gathering. For instance, he writes:
What are courts to do if data could be generated to resolve a particular issue, but has not, or if data is unreliable or uncertain? For two reasons, it is
insufﬁcient to say that these questions should simply be answered through
research. First, lack of determinate data does not let judges off the hook;
judges must either consider, or not consider, family status in setting bail in
every single bail decision. However, the theory could provide that governments should be required to generate the data on this . . . as quickly as possible, so that going forward, decisions would be made on the correct basis.23

In advancing this possibility, Professor Chin correctly reminds readers
that getting empirical information is not costless and that justice should
be “dole[d] out as the best available approximation rather than as an exact
quantity”24—so we should be careful before anyone insists that the government perform empirical studies of every this and that.
But as should be clear by now (if it wasn’t already clear in the book),25
the methodological strategy of the book was to erect normative speed
23. Chin, supra note 3, at 144.
24. Id.
25. See Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 150 (“We are open to being proven
wrong through credible empirical evidence that would show that the beneﬁts or burdens are
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bumps to get judges and policymakers to think about why family status as
a trigger for exemptions or liabilities, subsidies or taxes, within the criminal justice system might be troubling. Empirical evidence may show that
they are, after all, needed because they prove valuable or necessary to
achieve a compelling or substantial interest. Of course, a judge faced with
applying a law that uses family status as a beneﬁt or burden may not see
herself as free to ignore the legislature; but in exercising the judge’s discretion (say, within sentencing or statutory interpretation), we think our
considerations certainly have some force.
Still, our primary audience for our recommendations was not the
judges simply required to follow laws but those who make them, whether
through common law development or through legislation, ordinance, or
administrative regulation. We cannot force those people to do empirical
analyses, and we know doing it well can be costly and complex. But without much already available to us on the empirical side before we began,
our book at least furnishes a starting point for policymakers to consider the
various normative costs and consequences involved in the criminal justice
policies under analysis.
Professor Chin wishes we had been clearer about when we thought we
saw a trump card that would render our prescriptions impervious to empirical challenge. In short, he sees three types of policy analysis: (1) when
the commitment to principle renders almost all empirical analysis irrelevant, (2) when empirical analysis determines the right policy result, and
(3) when a range of policy outcomes are plausibly consistent with principles and knowable facts.26 Perhaps it is possible to divide the world of our
policy recommendations into these three categories, and Professor Chin is
certainly right that we didn’t use these categories to summarize our book’s
contents. Unfortunately, when we wrote the book, we hadn’t had the beneﬁt of Professor Chin’s typology to make clear when a policy prescription
fell into one of the categories he speciﬁes.
It is true that we think certain choices within criminal justice policy
are likely to be immune from empirical contestation. For example, our

necessary to achieve some compelling state goal that cannot be achieved through less discriminatory means. At the very least, we hope our evaluation of the beneﬁts and burdens
defendants receive throughout the criminal law encourages other thinkers and policymakers to develop more reﬁned and systematic thinking about these pervasive practices.”).
26. See Chin, supra note 3, at 144.
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commitment to nondiscrimination within the criminal justice system
with respect to gays, single parents, and those with (or without) “nontraditional” families is quite strong, though we might divide amongst ourselves over how many Type I errors (mistaken convictions = false positives)
or Type II errors (when the factually guilty go unpunished = false negatives) we would stomach to achieve equality in this respect. Nonetheless,
the usefulness of the normative framework we develop in the book remains: policymakers will at least have a clearer sense of the various values
at stake, some of which might be incommensurable.
Still, looking back at the book now, we don’t think it would be hard to
identify places when we argue that empirical evidence would be particularly
useful to settle a question of whether a family status policy is a good idea and
when we are pretty conﬁdent that our normative commitments produce
conclusions that are virtually immune to empirical evidence. Indeed, when
we were summarizing our conclusions in the Coda,27 we were clear that we
remain open-minded to what better empirical evidence might show, but
we expressed strong doubts that discriminatory treatment on the basis of
status rather than caregiving function would ever be a narrowly tailored
solution to further any compelling state interest.
Perhaps another way of answering Professor Chin’s charge is simply to
say that almost all our ﬁnal conclusions fall into category (3) because they
are all provisional, with one exception: if the criminal justice system is going to use beneﬁts and burdens tied to caregiving responsibilities, it must
not discriminate against gays, single parents, or other individuals in alternative caregiving arrangements. Such policies would fall into category (1),
where we doubt empirical evidence is likely to sway us.
Even summarizing our ultimate conclusions this way, however, casts at least
some doubt on the usefulness of Professor Chin’s typology. After all, with
some recommendations, we argued “in the alternative,” i.e., if you don’t extend to gays or others wrongly excluded, the burden/beneﬁt must be rejected,
but if you don’t discriminate, you can adopt or retain X policy, assuming the
empirical facts are as we suppose. That’s what makes it hard to insert our recommendations cleanly into the categories Professor Chin provides.
Still, it is fair to generalize that many of our ultimate conclusions fall
into category (3). As Professor Chin recognizes, the value of policy analysis

27. Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 150.
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in category (3) is to “highlight the costs, beneﬁts, interests, values and
other considerations that policymakers should use to choose from
among reasonable alternatives. Policy analysis [within category (3)] can
also identify the parameters beyond which policy would become unsound.”28 That is what we hoped to do, for the most part. If we were successful there, the book performed its core function. As was clear to careful
readers of the book, we could not always reach agreement on our prescriptions regarding the various laws under scrutiny in the book; surely we
can’t be surprised that we can’t secure full agreement from readers.
Indeed, precisely for this reason, Professor Chin’s effort to show why
he disagrees with one of our provisional conclusions—that we should by
and large abandon intrafamilial testimonial privileges—doesn’t really
shake the foundation of our book. To be sure, he makes some important
points, undermining several admittedly weaker links in the chain of our
arguments on that issue.29 But Professor Chin’s speciﬁc thrust doesn’t require too much of a parry. That we didn’t capture every nuance under
each of our normative guideposts only shows what we already know: policymakers will need to use our normative guideposts to consider different
values and empirical foundations for judgment. That they might weigh
accuracy more than equality in some cases is within the realm of reasonable disagreement.
Without more empirical evidence to answer some basic questions about
what the likely effects of spousal privileges are, we can’t say deﬁnitively
what a perfect criminal justice system should do. Would the eradication of
the privilege lead to more lying or to more accurate information? We
think the latter, but we don’t have the smoking gun study on that one, and
28. Chin, supra note 3, at 145.
29. Kudos to Professor Chin, in particular on his footnote 10. Still, it remains unclear
why Professor Chin is so averse to establishing presumptions (as speed bumps) against legal rules when the etiology of a law is patently troublesome. If a state were currently living
under laws established during and by a theocratic regime, and then, over time, the state
tried to rectify many of its laws to eliminate discrimination against religious minorities,
would it be so terrible to lodge skepticism toward those remaining laws, especially when
those remaining laws, even though facially neutral, operate in a manner that disadvantages
those religious minorities? To be clear, we weren’t suggesting that the etiology, standing
alone, was a reason to strike down a law that has already been modernized and “cleansed.”
Rather, we were making a narrower claim: that criminal laws that had once served the
ends of patriarchy need to be examined to ensure that they no longer are drafted in such
a way as to continue facilitating state-sanctioned subordination of women.
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we’re uncertain how one would measure that anyway. Perhaps Professor
Chin’s instincts on that issue differ—but we notice that he isn’t waving
such a study in our face, either. Our effort at coming up with a provisional
conclusion was based on what we think we know and on the values we
forthrightly admitted; thus it constitutes a ﬁrst pass at applying our framework. The framework is more important than the ultimate evaluation,
which we concede requires more information, when plausibly available
and subject to assessment, and may require policymakers to prioritize
among incommensurable values. As we’ve maintained: bring us a study
and, if it holds up, we’ll add it to the mix.
What we won’t add to the mix, however, is Professor Chin’s argument
that the spousal privileges might be justiﬁable because the criminal law
may be used to “reinforce community values.”30 At least there, we do have
a “category (1)” backstop: that the criminal law cannot be used to reinforce
a discriminatory community value. If jurisdictions are not willing, for instance, to open up marriage to same-sex partners, we simply aren’t willing
to let a liberal state reinforce a discriminatory institution with the apparatus of the criminal law. But, of course, even if the state does open up marriage to gays and does nothing more, it still creates a world that places
coupling ahead of individuals or noncoupled groups—a posture that
stands, in the criminal justice context, in need of strong justification beyond “reinforcement of community values.” So although Professor Chin’s
helpful critique is forthright about his desire to promote equality in marriage for gays, and thus ﬁx some of the problems we identify, he does not
think it’s impermissible for the criminal justice system (or other aspects of
the state) to distribute beneﬁts (or burdens) that would operate to promote
coupledom as against the interests of those who would remain single or
polyamorous. Whether such policy design in the context of distributive
justice is tolerable remains highly contested; it’s something about which
the three of us have substantial concerns.31 But it is precisely the criminal
law’s ability to reinforce community values so coercively that makes these

30. Id. at 148. Professor Chin himself won’t have the criminal law reinforce community
values that discriminate against gays. See id. at n.11.
31. For an excellent and lacerating overview of the extent to which our civil laws promote and privilege family status, see Ruthann Robson, Compulsory Matrimony, in Feminist
and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations (Ashgate,
2009).
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discriminatory statements so dangerous, requiring us to be very careful
about avoiding such statements altogether.
Indeed, it’s partly for that reason that we must also protest Professor
Chin’s claim that liberal minimalism “is a device that will identify only
nondebatable cases.”32 Professor Chin advances his point by reference to
Professor Darryl Brown’s discussion of how sodomy prohibitions were frequently thought justiﬁed by the harm principle.33 Unfortunately, we don’t
think this is enough to substantiate his claim against liberal minimalism.
First, we don’t equate liberal minimalism with the harm principle as such.
Even if we had done so, that people might have made spurious arguments
in the past under the guise of the harm principle (as in the examples furnished by Prof. Brown) doesn’t mean that the harm principle or other limiting strategies have no capacity to police the boundaries of when it’s
permissible to invoke such a principle or limit.
More importantly, we used the modiﬁer “liberal” prior to minimalism to
convey two important meanings in our book. One had to do with the signiﬁcance of being able to ascribe voluntariness to a person’s action prior to
criminal liability (through some germane exercise of autonomous choice),
and the second had to do with ensuring the criminal law didn’t trample on
fundamental individual liberties. Thus, for example, if socially conservative
legal moralists wanted to impose criminal law burdens on siblings or uncles
or aunts by virtue of the “harms” such burdens were meant to prevent, our
liberal minimalism would point out that this form of familial status is, on
its own, an impermissible basis to create criminal liability, since no one “opts
in” to such familial status. Maybe that seems like a “nondebatable” case, but
consider: many people (including people who don’t necessarily think of
themselves as social conservatives, such as Professor Cahn) would reject our
proposal to get rid of incest laws placing criminal prohibitions upon mature
consensual sexual relations between adult siblings or aunts and uncles and
their nephews or nieces. If that’s the case, then liberal minimalism cannot
be so easily dismissed as Professor Chin seems to suppose.34

32. See Chin, supra note 3, at n.13.
33. See id. (quoting Darryl K. Brown, History’s Challenge to Criminal Law Theory, 3
Crim. L. & Phil. 271, 281 (2009)).
34. Professor Chin also argues that liberal minimalism should counsel in favor of keeping
the parental discipline defense because excessive parental violence could be civilly regulated.
Although we embrace the idea of “parental and pediatric education” to prevent spanking,
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Liberal minimalism, one might reasonably think, has implications beyond
criminal law. But we didn’t avoid analysis of the civil law and the institutions
of distributive justice in the book just because of our comparative advantage as scholars of criminal law. Rather, we think criminal law has distinctive commitments and dangers that make it necessary to be especially
concerned about discrimination on the basis of family status within its domain.35 That we leave open the possibility of legitimate reasons for civil legal institutions to consider family status doesn’t render our analysis akin
to a simple barter about price.36
We’ll close this section of our reply by reference to one argument we wish
to emphasize about the nature of empirical studies that overlaps in its relevance to answering both Professor Berman and Professor Chin. Although
we’ve earlier alluded to the point here, we think it’s worth reiteration that
empirics only get you so far when analyzing the justiﬁcations underlying
criminal laws. Consider the following examples:
• It shall be required of young brown-haired women to financially
support older blond-haired women in their neighborhood if the
blonds need the money; the failure to take adequate care of a needy
older blond woman will render the younger well-off brown-haired
woman eligible for criminal punishment.
• Jews will not be permitted or required to testify against each other
in courts of law; the same goes for Presbyterians.
If states adopted rules like these, wouldn’t it be worth setting out a preliminary set of reasons to think that these laws raise yellow or red ﬂags? If states
had rules like these permeating their legislative codes, we don’t think, pace
one of the reasons public enforcement against parental violence (beyond a de minimis standard) is necessary is because there is no plausible private enforcement mechanism: children
will be typically unable to bring suit against parents. Cf., e.g., Markel, Collins, & Leib,
supra note 4 at 104–05, 109, 113.
35. We recognize that civil and criminal justice can blend at points: for example, violations of tax laws can often be enforced with the apparatus of criminal justice. However,
when the criminal law gets involved, we think there are serious reasons to be concerned
about an overly promiscuous use of criminal sanction (e.g., infringing on basic liberties) as
well as an arbitrary use of such sanction (e.g., denigrating persons by virtue of status, not
conduct).
36. See Chin, supra note 3, at text accompanying n.12. We note the possibility that civil
law could promote “family life” that is repronormative without being inherently discriminatory toward gays and lesbians.
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Professor Berman, that it would be “problematically shallow or distorting”
for criminal law professors to venture their considered views that these laws
raise a number of troubling concerns based on what we know so far and
could reasonably predict. It would be perfectly appropriate to note that these
designations based on gender or religion or hair color are problematic in light
of our aspirations for a just and safe legal order within a liberal democracy.
The ﬁrst rule, for instance, implicates concerns about arbitrary discrimination and unfair “takings” through the use of criminal law; the second raises
similar concerns of arbitrary discrimination, and further presents a risk that
the criminal justice system will face an increased level of Type I and Type II
errors that jeopardize retribution and crime prevention—in the name of cultivating “fellow-feeling” among certain coreligionists.37
If we asked people to do an analysis of such laws as drafted, we wouldn’t
judge them as having failed to dig deep simply because they weren’t able
to produce empirical evidence showing Type I or Type II errors. Nor
would we think the endeavor is a failure because they didn’t marshal empirical evidence of the crimes that weren’t committed because the privilege between the coreligionists conduced to less crime, rather than more
crime. Assuming the possibility of such a deterrent effect, it would be
pretty hard to verify empirically the crimes that weren’t committed as a result of the existence of these privileges. At best, we could see if jurisdictions with such evidentiary privileges had higher or lower crime rates, or
perhaps we could see if a state that adopted such a privilege experienced a
decline or rise in crime subsequent to its enactment or adoption. Thus, it
might be true that “unless and until we have a deep understanding and full
appreciation of the interplay of family connections and crime, any account
or assessment of family-affected criminal laws will be shallow and potentially distorting.”38 But if that’s the standard by which all legal analysis is
37. Imagine two Jews and a Christian, Shimon, Levi, and Paul, respectively. Paul is, at
T1, mistakenly convicted for a murder actually committed by Shimon. At T2, Shimon
commits another murder, witnessed only by Levi, who also knows that Shimon committed the earlier murder and that Paul did not. The “proposed” rule prohibiting Jews from
testifying against each other would mean that, if the prosecutors wanted to prosecute
Shimon for the crime at T2, there would be increased risk of a false negative (i.e., Shimon
escapes punishment); meanwhile Levi’s inability to inculpate Shimon for both crimes
makes it more difﬁcult to prove to others that Paul is the victim of a mistaken conviction,
i.e., the rule increases the risk of a Type I (false positive) error.
38. Berman, supra note 1, at 120.
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judged, especially at the beginning of a research agenda, it would be an odd
one to use. Or so we think.

I I . P R O F E S S O R B E R M A N ’ S N AG G I N G F E E L I N G S
A B O U T O U R “ T R U E ” G OA L S

The second part of Professor Berman’s review raises a cluster of disparate
inquiries.
A. What Kind of Criminogenesis Matters?

First, Professor Berman argues that we’re less interested in the criminal
justice system and its distinctive values than we are in the “construction
and norms of family status in modern society.”39 Professor Berman draws
this inference about our “true project and motivation” and “true goals and
commitments” by looking at Part II of our book, where, in the course of
examining which factors should apply to the scrutiny of family ties burdens, we note that family ties burdens are less likely than family ties beneﬁts to incentivize more crime directly or to disrupt the accurate prosecution
of the guilty or exoneration of the innocent. We are puzzled by Professor
Berman’s speculations that the interests we identify as relevant to the ﬁrst
half of the book (having to do with family ties beneﬁts) are less sincerely
considered than the ones we think relevant to Part II (having to do with
family ties burdens).
Let’s stipulate for the moment that the criminal justice system has a
compelling interest in reducing and punishing the incidence of (at least)
malum in se crimes. For reasons we elaborate in the book and that should
be readily perceptible to readers of this Essay, it seems likely to us that intrafamilial evidentiary privileges or laws granting exemptions from prosecution for harboring family member fugitives are practices that create risks
that will inhibit the just prosecution and punishment of persons engaged
in malum in se crimes. By contrast, we expressed doubts that the family
ties burdens we explore (e.g., criminal laws requiring adult children to pay
for the costs of indigent elderly parents) will directly reduce Type I or Type
II errors with respect to (malum in se) crimes. Of course, as we noted in
39. Id. at 123.
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the book, such laws obviously will create a new form of criminal liability
for offenders who violate the laws creating family ties burdens, but that
points to a different kind of criminogenesis concern than the one we were
raising in Part I.40
If Professor Berman’s claim is that family ties burdens such as parental support laws or bigamy laws indirectly serve to reduce or punish the incidence of
malum in se crimes, then, if true, that would be a problem for our claim that
the family ties burdens typically do not raise issues associated with the goal of
reducing Type I and II errors. But, contra Professor Berman, we do actually
consider such arguments when they have been raised in defense of these family ties burdens, such as parental supervision laws.41 And if that’s Professor
Berman’s argument, he has, again, adduced no evidence showing that states
without such family ties burdens are suffering worse crime rates (especially
with respect to malum in se crimes) than states with such family ties burdens.
B. The Implications for Domestic Violence

In the same vein, and again, quite curiously, Professor Berman suggests our
“true goals” associated with “our general presumption” against the use of
family status leads us away from discussing the laws of domestic violence
more.42 Why, he asks, don’t we address developments ranging from the
“elimination of marital rape exceptions, to the invocation of uniquely
severe sentences when parents rape or kill their children, to the creation
of mandatory prosecution programs for domestic violence and mandatory
reporting requirements for child abuse?”43 We can’t quite espy the connection between these “true goals” and this selection of what we do and
do not examine.
But more importantly, as we explain in the Coda, we do have explanations for why we don’t address the domestic violence laws in great detail,
notwithstanding our view that these laws are a signiﬁcant and important
aspect of our ﬁght against the scourge of domestic violence.

40. This was the signiﬁcance of the point we made in the footnote Professor Berman
references. Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 199–200 n.9.
41. E.g., id., at 112–18 (discussing deterrence evidence and arguments associated with
parental supervision laws).
42. Berman, supra note 1, at 119.
43. Id. at 124.
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As an initial matter, our studies revealed no obvious and consistent pattern to whether domestic violence laws across the states operate as either
beneﬁts or burdens. For example, the states continuing to accord some
preferential treatment to perpetrators of marital rape could be characterized as conferring a beneﬁt to a defendant based on his family status,44
whereas a law mandating arrest in cases of domestic assault, but not stranger
assault, could be characterized as a burden, assuming the “shall-arrest” law
was triggered by legal family status, rather than just coresidence or intimate
association. In other words, there is diversity regarding whether one’s family status triggers an enhancement or a mitigation of punishment in the domestic violence context.
Moreover, the book developed two signiﬁcant claims relevant to the design of domestic violence policy. First, although much work to improve the
situation has already been done in this regard in recent years, to the extent
a domestic violence law is written in terms of traditional family status, we urged
shifting the focus to circumstances and function, not legal family status.45
(Co-residence or intimate association would be helpful factors to look at;
the production of a marriage certiﬁcate, by contrast, should not be a necessary condition to serve as an element that triggers the intended protections.)
Thus, needless to say, an individual victim should not be denied the protection of a state statute on restraining orders because she is in a same-sex relationship rather a heterosexual one. Second, if jurisdictions decide to impose
burdens based on functional categories such as voluntarily assumed caregiving relationships, then we think it is justiﬁable (from the standpoint of our
normative framework) to impose additional burdens (in terms of liability or
punishment enhancements) because of the moral wrong associated with a
caregiver abusing the trust owed to the recipient of care. We described this
in the book as a separate wrong involving an abuse of trust that affects the
public because the person who breaches a voluntarily entered caregiving relationship (e.g., a spouse or parent) has engaged in a form of “sequestering”
and “lulling” of the sort that is analogous to the kind of duty that has traditionally triggered omissions liability at common law.

44. See Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 11.
45. Of course, to the extent many states have drafted domestic violence laws in terms
neutral to family status, they generally fall outside our designated focus of attention. As we
said earlier, our decision not to examine them in depth obviously does not deny their signiﬁcance to the criminal justice system as a whole.
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C. Why Family Status Ought to Be Largely
Irrelevant to Criminal Liability

In further service to his thesis about our “true goals,” Professor Berman
also challenges the analogy we make between religious afﬁliation or ethnic
background on the one hand and the family status of the defendant on the
other.46 As we emphasize at different points, our view does not deny the
psychological or moral importance of bearing the responsibilities and role
of parent, sibling, daughter, and so forth.47 Rather, we challenge the moral
signiﬁcance that family status ought to play in the distribution of beneﬁts
or burdens within the criminal justice system when we are able instead to
focus on more clearly delineated functions. In that respect, we reiterate
our point that family status is morally irrelevant to the determination of
liability and punishment, just as one’s religious afﬁliation or ethnic background is in the absence of other relevant information.
To elaborate a bit more, we think it’s worth examining Professor Berman’s
three speciﬁc contextual challenges on this point. First, regarding the issue of
whether parents who rape or kill their children should be exposed to higher
sentences,48 we already mentioned how our Coda in fact addresses this question directly, arguing that this scenario usually permits a ﬁnding of a separate
abuse of trust that occurs in that situation, and thus, that such a wrong permits increased punishment.49 Of course, on our account, the application of
the enhancement should not turn simply on whether the defendant is a parent or the victim is a minor child; rather the inquiry should be focused on
whether the defendant can be said to have voluntarily undertaken a relationship of caregiving to a victim who can be said to be especially vulnerable to
exploitation through that trust relationship, and whether such a trust relationship could be understood by the public to exist. That focus would encompass consideration of a range of factors beyond just bloodlines or legally
recognized status relationships. So the voluntarily assumed caregiving relationship is the morally signiﬁcant point upon which beneﬁts and burdens
ought to turn. The label of brother, mother, or uncle does little work alone.
46. Interestingly, some other critics of the book try to gain traction by stressing the
analogy between family status and religious afﬁliation. See Alice Ristroph & Melissa
Murray, Disestablishing the Family, Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
47. Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 4, at 180 n. 62.
48. See Berman, supra note 1, at 124.
49. See Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 153.
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This focus on function and circumstance, not family status, inﬂuences
the outcomes in the other two cases Professor Berman proposes as tests:
(a) a “mother’s decision to ‘kidnap’ her own son from an abusive ex-husband
and kidnapping someone else’s child,” and (b) a “modern-day Jean
Valjean stealing bread to feed his own family and stealing bread to give to
a soup kitchen.”50
In the former situation, the defendant mother might be able to prove
an afﬁrmative defense (resulting from fear that the child will be endangered by the abusive parent); in other words, the status of the kidnapper
as parent does not, in our view, legitimize the desire for leniency or no
liability—it is the plausibility of the justiﬁcation (or excuse) operating for
the defendant. In the second hypothetical, we might wonder whether
Valjean has better information (than a stranger) regarding imminent danger to the family, and that is what motivates the theft; if true, he too might
be a suitable claimant for an afﬁrmative defense.
Importantly, it is not, in our view, Valjean’s standing as caregiver as
such that would negate liability or warrant reduced punishment. Indeed,
if circumstances were such that an indigent neighbor knew of Valjean’s
family’s imminent starvation, we would want the indigent neighbor to be
able to beneﬁt from an afﬁrmative defense; we don’t see why one would
limit the availability of the defense only to someone who stood in a legally
recognized relationship to those within the Valjean family. Well, actually,
we do see why—it is easy to use simple categories that the law has drawn on
in the past for administrative ease, based on historical moral blind spots. But
we spent great effort in the book trying to convince readers that administrative ease or uncritical embraces of tradition are no excuse for reﬂexively
choosing status over factors like function and consent when it comes to
matters as serious as criminal justice.
I I I . P R O F E S S O R CA H N

Professor Naomi Cahn adds some welcome historical and cultural texture
to some of the issues regarding voluntariness, incest, and domestic violence that we discuss in our book. That said, we’re not persuaded about
the speciﬁc challenges to us that she advances.
50. Berman, supra note 1, at 125. Note that Professor Berman’s hypothetical gives us no
reason to think a person kidnapping someone else’s child will be saving that child from abuse.
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A. Voluntariness and Motherhood

Professor Cahn begins her essay by discussing the voluntary nature of family relationships, which we cite as an important consideration when evaluating whether a particular family ties burden is justiﬁed, and suggests
that our account of voluntariness in the parent-child and spouse-spouse contexts is “highly problematic and insufﬁciently thick.”51 Although she brieﬂy
mentions that voluntariness is hard to locate in the spousal context when
there is domestic violence, she then focuses her discussion here entirely on the
parent-child relationship and suggests that “poor women are least likely to
use birth control and most likely to experience unplanned pregnancies, and
so to call their parenthood ‘voluntary’ distorts their relationship with their
children.”52
As we acknowledged in the book, there are some “complications with
this general observation of voluntariness” in the context of parent-child
relationships.53 We are grateful to Professor Cahn for fleshing out the
important role that poverty can play in inﬂuencing an individual’s decisionmaking regarding procreation.54
Nonetheless, even though it is true that poverty may affect a woman’s
choices regarding procreation, we do not think that undermines our arguments. First, as long as individuals freely choose to engage in sexual
conduct, and as long as the state continues to give individuals the option
to terminate their parental responsibilities (e.g., by placing their children
up for adoption), we believe it is appropriate to characterize the obligations that arise from the status of parenthood as voluntarily assumed, even

51. Naomi Cahn, Protect and Preserve? 13(1) New Crim. L. Rev. 127, 129 (2010).
52. Id. at 130. For what it’s worth, just as we acknowledge many of the difﬁculties associated with assuming voluntariness in the parental relationship under certain circumstances, our book also addresses the challenges to voluntariness that might erupt in the
spousal context. See, e.g., Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 87–88. We speciﬁcally
identiﬁed human trafﬁcking victims forced into marriage as an example where voluntarism
can easily be rebutted, but we concede that premarital domestic violence might also, in certain circumstances, be sufﬁcient to rebut the ascription of voluntariness in the spousal context too.
53. Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 88.
54. And we recognize that various civil laws provide strong incentives for marriage and
procreation. See generally Robson, supra note 31. That said, we don’t think the array of social
inﬂuences and legal and economic incentives, as such, amount to coercion or compulsion
in any form recognizable to ordinary linguistic or legal usage.
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if the choice to retain parental rights is an emotionally or ﬁnancially difﬁcult one.
Importantly, even if parenthood under such circumstances were deemed
involuntary, there is the signiﬁcant question about how the law should
judge the relative capacities and vulnerabilities of poor mothers vis-à-vis
their children. If a woman becomes a mother in part because no subsidized forms of birth control are available, the administrators of Medicaid
refused to pay for her abortion, and no abortion providers are willing to
work pro bono,55 would Professor Cahn really be willing to suggest that
this poor woman should be relieved from the responsibility to protect her
infant from imminent peril if she could do so at no risk to herself? In that
situation, we think ensuring the safety of a child “remains the most fundamental of reasonable burdens,”56 at least until she hands the child over
to the state or some other private party who would assume the responsibility of care. Don’t get us wrong. Our society surely needs to do more to
improve access for poor women to health care generally, and to contraception and abortion in particular. But those class-based problems don’t
seem to us to be sufﬁcient to relieve parents of a duty to perform costless
rescues—a duty we think is voluntarily assumed given the available
(though no doubt difﬁcult and emotionally fraught) “avoidance” options
of forbearing from sex, using contraception, abortion, or terminating
one’s parental rights.
B. Incest (among Adults)

Although Professor Cahn agrees with our views on most of the family ties
burdens, she wants to challenge our views of incest. We think her principal disagreement with us here centers on whether incest bans should prohibit
relationships between individuals who were once in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency—meaning parents and children, in all forms that relationship can take, including step-parenting and foster parenting—even after
the children reach adulthood. For example, she argues that “it remains critical
to recognize the uniqueness of the breach of trust between family members
55. See Cahn, supra note 51, at 131 (describing how many poor women who want to
have abortions cannot obtain them because Medicaid funding may generally not be used
to fund abortions absent rape, incest, or endangerment to the life of the mother.)
56. Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 100.
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that occurs if these family members engage in sexual relationships, even
when the family members are adults.”57
Professor Cahn’s essay affords us the chance to reiterate our position on
this issue. Two of the three authors (Collins and Leib) fully agree “that
persons who once had a relation of asymmetric dependence should be precluded from future relations,” even when the parties are both adults, because of precisely the concerns that Professor Cahn identiﬁes.58 Professor
Markel, on the other hand, believes that even these individuals may be able
to form a relationship based on genuine and mature consent, assuming the
parties were willing to take measures to signify that genuine and mature
consent before others.59
To the extent that Professor Cahn is suggesting that the criminal law
should be used to prohibit all relationships between adults of different
generations, even when all the parties are mature adults, the three authors
are of one mind on this issue—i.e, that a blanket prohibition via criminal
law is improper. Imagine an uncle and niece, who meet for the ﬁrst time
when the niece is thirty-ﬁve years old and the uncle ﬁfty-ﬁve. If the parties are truly capable of genuine and mature consent, we do not believe
that the criminal justice system, with its threat of coercive stigma and/or
incarceration, should be utilized to infringe upon their intimate associational rights in the absence of any showing of coercion. The state remains
free to use mechanisms of civil justice, for example by denying marriage
licenses, and the powerful weapon of social stigma to signal its disapproval
of such relationships; we take no position on that issue.
C. Domestic Violence

Finally, Professor Cahn turns to the issue of domestic violence and illustrates
the seriousness of the problem and the long neglect of this issue by the
criminal justice system. We largely agree with her descriptive characterizations of the problem. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, we think there is a
basis for enhanced penalties in the context of crimes against those under
one’s voluntary care based on an abuse of trust theory.60 Professor Cahn
57. Cahn, supra note 51, at 136.
58. Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 211 n.70.
59. Id. at 121; 211 nn.70, 72, 74.
60. Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note 4, at 152–53.
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appears to agree, arguing that “some crimes really are different because of
the abuse of trust,”61 and as we plainly indicated above and in the Coda to
the book, we concur.62 As we wrote and elaborated earlier, “breaking a
covenant of care by inﬂicting injury [with mens rea] is thus a greater moral
wrong than inﬂicting an injury on an individual to whom such a speciﬁc
covenant of care is not owed . . . .”63 But as we also emphasized, the abuse
of trust theory supporting an enhancement would not be restricted to
family members. We could imagine a range of people outside the spouse
or parent context who might also warrant increased punishment based on
voluntary assumptions of supervisory or custodial care.
Moreover, toward her conclusion, Professor Cahn endorses the controversial claim that victims should be able to dictate or control the criminal
justice outcomes associated with domestic violence cases.64 Whereas we
may disagree (amongst ourselves) to varying degrees with the substance of
the claim that victims should be given outcome-determinative inﬂuence
on domestic violence as well as other crimes, we will prescind from extensive comment on Professor Cahn’s apparent prescription. After all, to the
extent modern domestic violence statutes in American jurisdictions do not
turn on family status, but instead focus on co-residence and/or intimate
association, we don’t think our framework has anything unusually special
to say regarding how to strike the balance between victims and prosecutors in this delicate context.65 That’s why we thought this issue was beyond
the scope of our book, a conclusion Professor Cahn notes.

61. Cahn, supra note 41, at 139.
62. Professor Cahn argues, however, without citation, that the “the book alleges that
the law seems to assume domestic violence is worse than other kinds of violence,” Cahn,
supra note 41, at 137. Professor Cahn misreads us here; the book recognizes that there is a
diversity of approaches under past and current law regarding whether domestic violence is
more condemnable than “nondomestic” violence. See Markel, Collins, & Leib, supra note
4, at 151 (noting that states have taken “wildly inconsistent” positions regarding domestic violence laws). Our normative approach, however, explains why we think domestic
violence involving an abuse of power or trust warrants enhanced penalties.
63. Id. at 153.
64. Cahn, supra note 41, at 141 (“We might seek to develop new policies that allow victims control over choices in the criminal justice and mediation system because of their
family ties.”).
65. We do commend to readers, however, that they consider the tensions identiﬁed by
Jeanne Suk in her recent book, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence
Revolution Is Transforming Privacy (2009).
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Unfortunately, Professor Cahn mistakenly thinks that, merely because
we acknowledge this tension between victim autonomy and prosecutorial
obligation, we are somehow committed to recognizing the need for special treatment for family ties.66 Here, we disagree on two grounds. First, as
mentioned above, the challenges posed by these laws to victims’ autonomy
arise in the domestic violence context regardless of whether the victim was
related to the perpetrator. Second, and more importantly, the tension between recognizing the desires of victims and the desires of the prosecutors
or public is a tension that, contra Professor Cahn, has long transcended the
domestic violence context.67

I V. C O N C L U S I O N

It is always rewarding to have an opportunity to reply to critics—especially distinguished ones who have taken the trouble to ask the hard questions. We reiterate our gratitude to them for engaging our work and giving
us food for thought as we stand back and look at the product of our years
of work together. We hope that this Essay captured a few useful observations and addressed some of our critics’ largest concerns.

66. Cahn, supra note 41, at 137 (“‘Domestic violence should, however, be treated differently from other violent crimes not involving family members.’ Indeed, one of the ‘important questions that are beyond the scope of [the book’s] limited efforts’ is how
‘criminalization may itself be threatening to women’s autonomy’ (153). Surely this is not a
question that would be asked about other violent crimes; we would not suggest that criminalizing violence ‘may itself be threatening to [the victim’s] autonomy.’ Yet, given the nature
of domestic violence, this is a legitimate inquiry. Obviously, domestic violence presents a
complex set of issues with respect to criminalization within the family.”).
67. Indeed, this well-trod territory over the rights and roles of victims (across all crimes,
not just ones involving domestic violence) has long been an obsession for theorists ranging
from retributivists to restorative justice proponents, among others. See generally Markus
Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights (2002);
George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev.
51 (1999); Michael S. Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 65 (1999); and Douglas E. Beloof, Paul G. Cassell, & Steven J. Twist, Victims
in Criminal Procedure (2nd ed. 2005).

